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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
      1.1 South Africa’s Agricultural Trade Background 
 
South African agriculture is highly dualistic, it comprises of commercial farmers who are 
predominantly white farmers and a large number of subsistence farmers who are largely 
black farmers.1 These types of farming co-exist and there are a number of reforms and 
agricultural support programs aimed at uplifting disadvantaged farming communities. South 
Africa has made substantial reforms in its agricultural policy since the dawn of democracy in 
1994. This was as a result of South Africa’s acceptance back in the global trade arena, which 
resulted in the country becoming the member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
 
Some of the reforms during 1990s pertaining to the liberalisation of both domestic and 
foreign trade resulted in South African government lowering support to agriculture.2 The 
Marketing of Agricultural Products Act 47 of 19963 substantially reduced government 
intervention, this forced commercial agricultural sector to adopt its investment decisions to 
new markets and developments. This also meant that the agricultural sector should adopt 
quality and productivity improvement in order to become more internationally competitive as 
a sector and take advantage of its export potential. 
 
Primary agriculture contributes approximately 3% to South Africa’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) as well as 7% of total employment.4 The agricultural sector is of paramount 
importance in the economy of South Africa as the country is among the world’s leading 
exporters of agro-food products such as wine, fresh fruits and sugar.5  
The country (South Africa) is a signatory to a number of trade agreements,6 which 
contributed to the liberalisation of the agricultural sector.  
                                                 
1 Ortman GM & King RP ‘Agricultural Cooperatives: Can they facilitate access of small-scale farmers in South 
Africa to input and product market?’ (2007) 46 (2) Agrekon 219.  
2Chitiga M, Kandiero T& Ngwenya P ‘Agricultural Trade Policy Reform in South Africa’ (2008) 47(1) Agrekon 
76-101. 
3 The objectives of Act 47 of 1996 are increasing market access to all market participants, to promote efficient 
marketing of agricultural products and optimisation of export earnings from agricultural products. 
4 South African government information, Department of Agriculture 2012/13 available at 
http://www.gcis.gov.za/sites/www.gcis.gov.za/files/docs/resourcecentre/pocketguide/2012/03%20Agriculture 
(Accessed 28 April 2014) 
5 Organization for economic cooperation and development Review of agricultural policies-South Africa (2006). 
6 The Trade Development and Cooperation agreement (TDCA) with EU, Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU), Southern African Development Trade Community (SADC) and many other trade arrangements. 
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The acceptance of South Africa back to the global trading regime which enabled the country 
to be signatory to trade agreements meant that the country had to align its policies to those of 
the WTO. The initial government policy from 1994 was Reconstruction and Development 
Program (RDP),7 in 1996 the government implemented the policy that was referred to as 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR).8 In 2006 government launched the 
Accelerated & Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGI-SA),9 in 2010 New Growth 
Path (NGP) was launched and complemented by National Development Plan (NDP) that was 
finalised in 2012, however for the purpose of this study we shall focus specifically on the 
trade policy. 
 
    1.1 South Africa’s Trade Policy soon after 1994 democratic elections.             
 
South Africa’s trade policy objective in the agricultural sector is to promote integration of the 
agricultural sector into a competitive global trade player and to encourage market access as 
well as access to technology, capital and competition.10 This is a core fundamental policy 
following South Africa’s participation in the multilateral agreements. South Africa’s 
participation in global trade is based on the premise of global openness to share market 
access on reciprocal basis. Global trade agreements are also known to reduce distortions that 
existed from indirect export subsidies such as electricity and transport rebates, export finance 
and credit guarantees and marketing allowances.11  
 
The agricultural trade policy is in line with the country’s Trade Policy and Strategy 
Framework (TPSF),12 which proposes a developmental trade policy that support and facilitate 
 the country’s revised industrial strategy.13 The policy that is pursued is meant to drive  
                                                 
7 The RDP was an integrated, coherent socio-economic economic policy framework adopted by the ANC when 
it first took power in 1994. 
8 GEAR was South African government 5year plan for growth, employment and redistribution. It focused on 
privatisation and the removal of exchange controls.  
9 ASGI-SA goals comprise of halving employment, ensuring that inflation remains within a range 3% to and 
improving growth. 
10 Jonsson G & Subramanian A Dynamic gains from trade evidence from South Africa (2001) 48(1) IMF Staff 
Paper. 
11 Ngqaweni S et al The SADC Countries and the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, A review of 
progress and challenges (2004)4 Department of Agricultural Economics, Extension and Rural 
Development/University of Pretoria.   
12 Department of Trade and Industry A South African Trade Policy and Strategy Framework (2010) Government 
Printers: Pretoria. Available at http://www.tralac.org/files/2012/12/Trade-Policy-and-Strategy-Framework-
2010.pdf 
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government’s major development goals such as, economic growth, job creation, poverty 
reduction, industrial development, restructuring and the promotion of high value exports,14 
The TPSF unlike the widespread trade liberalisation pursued by South Africa soon after 1994, 
seems to strike a balance between participation in global economy and preserving sufficient 
policy space to pursue domestic objectives. 
 
The shifts in policy has been largely around the deregulation of the marketing of agricultural 
products, changes in the fiscal policy of the agricultural sector, including the abolition of 
certain tax concessions that favoured the agricultural sector, trade policy included the 
ratification of farm commodities and a general liberalisation of agricultural trade including 
free trade agreements as well as the application of labour legislation to the agricultural 
sector15. 
 
The global trade arena has bilateral, regional and multilateral trade dimensions. South Africa 
is part of some regional trade agreements, such as its membership in the world’s oldest 
custom union, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).16 The primary goal for the 
union is to promote economic development through regional coordination of trade. The 
SACU Agreement was later reviewed in 2002 to address inter alia joint decision-making 
processes, revenue sharing formula as well as the question of external trade.17 
 
South Africa is also a member of another important regional trade formation, the South 
African Development Community (SADC)18 since August 1994.19  
SADC covers a larger Southern African region and is using a multilateral approach in its 
efforts to harmonize policies for collective development through trade and support. 
                                                                                                                                                        
13 Department of Trade and Industry A South African Trade Policy and Strategy Framework (2010) 1-6. 
14 Department of Trade and Industry A South African Trade Policy and Strategy Framework (2010) 12. 
15 See OECD OECD Review of Agricultural Policies - South Africa: Highlights and Policy Recommendations 
(2006) OECD: Paris.  
16 South Africa along with Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Namibia formed the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU) with a common custom tariff policy. Since most of the imported goods enter the sub-region 
through South African ports, a system of custom revenue sharing is in place. 
17 Kirk R & Stern M The New Southern African Customs Union Agreement (2003) 7. 
18 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is an organisation that strives for regional 
integration to promote economic growth, peace and security in the southern African region. 
It aims to create common political values, systems and institutions among its 14 member states, to build social 
and cultural ties, and to help alleviate poverty and enhance the standard. 
19Department of International Relations and Cooperation Southern African Development Community (SADC): 
History and present status (2015) available at http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/sadc.htm  
 (Accessed 28 April 2015) 
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  1.2 Problem Statement and Motivation 
 
South Africa has undergone significant trade liberalisation since the end of apartheid. 
Average protection in the form of tariff reduction has fallen while openness to trade has 
drastically increased. The macroeconomic performance as a result of trade liberalising has 
been unimpressive, this is largely because of slow pace output growth which has not been 
enough to generate an export –led growth boom similar to what has been witnessed in the 
East Asian manufacturing sector, in Latin America’s agriculture and in other dynamic 
emerging economies.20 South Africa just like many other food-exporting developing 
countries had hoped that the WTO through the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) would 
provide a platform for additional export earnings to alleviate poverty and to further advance 
its developmental goals. 
The major bone of contention has been export subsidies, both the European Union (EU) 
through its Common Agriculture Policies (CAP) and the United States (US) through its Farm 
Bills have massive subsidies for exporters largely for agribusiness, which are heavily trade 
distorting. The EU and the US have reduced their domestic support over the past decade. The 
EU’s total trade distorting support has shifted from $36.1 billion in 2001 (15% of its value of 
agricultural production) down to $10,3 millions in 2001, while the US dropped its trade 
distorting support from $21.5 billion to $14.4 billion in 2011.21 Some developing countries 
have increased total trade distorting subsidies such as India, which grew its support from $8.2 
billion to $16.4 billion between 2001 to 2008, Brazil moved from $1.3 billion to 3.6 billion 
between 2002 and 2012.22 While it is noted that there have been significant reductions in 
                                                 
20 Edwards L Trade liberalisation and factor returns in South Africa, 1988-2002 (2004) Paper presented at the 
Conference on “African development and poverty reduction: The macro-micro linkage’ held at Cape Town, 13-
15 October 2004.  
21 Akande C ‘an overview of the WTO negotiations on agriculture’ (2014) Geneva Watch 
http://www.eggfarmers.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Geneva-Watch_March-21-2014.pdf (accessed  
on the 20 August 2014) 
22 Akande C ‘an overview of the WTO negotiations on agriculture’ (2014) Geneva Watch 
http://www.eggfarmers.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Geneva-Watch_March-21-2014.pdf (accessed  
on the 20 August 2014) 
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domestic support measures under amber box and blue box23 in developed countries, such 
decline has been compensated by substantial increases in green box subsidies.24 
The US increased its green box subsidies from $46 billion in 1995 to $120 billion in 2010, 
while the EU increased its green box subsidies from $12 billion to $ 89 billion.25This ‘box-
shifting’ of subsidies from 'amber' to 'green' can be somewhat acceptable to WTO members, 
if these measures comply with the fundamental principle of being minimal production and 
trade distorting. However, if this is not so and the subsidies provided in 'green box' are found 
to be production or trade distorting, then there is a strong case for reopening the issue of 
domestic support provided under green box in the post Bali work program.26 
WTO members had already agreed to eliminate export subsidies in the broader sense when 
the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference set 2013 as a deadline. The EU and US trade 
distorting subsidies have been reduced partly due to policy reform, however it is clear that the 
2013 deadline was not met. This is because the Bali Ministerial Declaration in December 
2013 regretted that no agreement could be reached to completely eliminate export 
subsidies,27 The disagreements center on how much the US and the EU should reduce aid to 
their farmers and the extent to which countries such as India, China and South Africa should 
lower their import tariffs.  
Export subsidies28 are harmful because they directly support exporters, most commonly 
agribusinesses or transnational commodity traders, enabling them to displace local producers 
– most commonly small-scale farmers in the countries to which they sell their goods – with 
                                                 
23 Amber box refers to domestic subsidies to producers considered to be trade distorting and are subject to 
reduction in aggregate value and blue box refers to domestic subsidies that represent a further carve out from 
amber box. 
24 Green Box represents ‘safe’ subsidies which are not meant to distort trade, Developmental Box found in the 
AoA article 6(2) relates to developing countries, Blue Box represent a further carve out of Amber Box Article 
6(5), Amber Box considered as trade distorting and subject to reduction, Red Box prohibited under AoA. 
25 Banga R Impact of Green Box Subsidies on Agricultural Productivity, Productivity, Production and 
International Trade (2014) UNCTAD Background Paper No. RVC-11 
26 The decision at the Bali Round Ministerial Conference in December 2013 to establish work programme to be 
undertaken in the Committee on Agriculture with the aim of making recommendations for a permanent solution 
with regards to inter alia public stock-holding. 
27 A Jatkar & C Mukumba Unpacking the Bali Package A snapshot of the Bali Ministerial Decisions of the WTO 
Members (20144) Centre for International Trade, Economics & Environment: Jaipur.  Available at 
http://www.cuts-citee.org/pdf/Unpacking_the_Bali_Package-
A_Snapshot_of_the_Bali_Ministerial_Decisions_of_the_WTO_Members.pdf (accessed  on the 12 May 2015) 
28 Export subsidies (Red Box) are those listed on Article 9 such as direct payments contingent on export 
performance and export of government stocks at a price below domestic market levels. Domestic subsidies 
(Blue and Green Boxes) with blue box referring to direct payments under production limiting schemes, the Blue 
Box differs from Green Box in that it is not decoupled in the sense of paragraph 6(b) of Annex 2 of the AoA. 
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artificially cheap products. The presence of subsidies also encourages overproduction, which 
leads to surplus crops. Such surplus is then sold below the cost of production, which severely 
depress world prices.  
It is therefore important for member states in the WTO to work towards the elimination of 
trade distorting subsidies and crate a sound and fair trading environment for all member 
states. 
1.3 The Aim of the Research 
 
The aim of the research is to establish how trade distorting agricultural subsidies have 
impacted South Africa’s agricultural exports. The research will explore trade distorting 
subsidies and how South Africa’s trade liberalisation approach relative to its trading partners 
have impacted South Africa’s trade output, as well as suggesting effective policy 
recommendations for South Africa’s agricultural trade going forward. 
 1.4 Research Question 
 
Primary question: How has agricultural subsidies affected South African agricultural export 
potential and to what extent can South Africa use its current policy space within the ambit of 
the WTO law to turn its fortunes around and drive its developmental agenda? 
Secondary question: How best to approach South Africa’s position in BRICS29 in order to 
exert its influence and ensure that its interests are met?  
1.5 Rationale 
 
This research seeks to make a meaningful contribution to the global agricultural trade 
discourse, which is linked to critical issues such as food security, best practice in terms of a 
balanced and fair trade system as well as South Africa’s future prospects in global trade as a 
member of the WTO. It will also seek to share insights on the current approach of South 
Africa to global trade and make recommendations for future engagement of the country with 
global players such as the US and the EU on the WTO platform. 
 
 
                                                 
29 BRICS is an acronym for an association of five major emerging economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa. 
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1.6 Delimitation of the Study 
 
The research will look at South Africa’s agricultural export to its key trading partners, which 
are EU and the US. The main focus shall be the adverse impact of agricultural subsidies to 
the agricultural sector in South Africa. Agriculture as a sector plays a significant role in job 
creation, poverty reduction, exports revenues and rural development.30 
 
The study will look comprehensively at the actual AoA, and then look at the three pillars 
which underpin the agreement, which are mainly market access, domestic support and export 
subsidies.  
 
1.7 Research Methodology 
 
The research will review the current available literature on the topic of agricultural export 
subsidies. The primary source of information will comprise WTO treaties, Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA) in relation to agricultural subsidies, South Africa’s policies and position 
on agricultural exports, development as well as on agricultural subsidies. 
 
Comparative approach will be employed in which discussions around the degree of 
participation and the level of influence of South Africa and other developing countries such 
as Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICS) to the WTO will be thoroughly analysed relative 
to developed nations such as the EU and the US, particularly on the issues of subsidies. This 
will help establish whether trade-distorting subsidies are being eliminated or just being 
shifted from prohibited category as specified in the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) to a 
category that is currently acceptable in the AoA. 
 
This is largely because these are emerging economies and therefore a good comparison will 
be made between emerging and developed economies. This will be done to establish 
challenges facing South Africa in the WTO in the context of developing countries in as far as 
negotiations and litigations are concerned in the DSU and finally to come up with 
recommendations. 
 
                                                 
30 Zunckel H The Southern African Response to Food Security and the Global Food Crisis (2010) 
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WTO articles and DSU legal text related to agricultural subsidies will be thoroughly analysed 
and a substantial contribution in the form of proposals to improve the modus operandi of 
these important institutions in ensuring fair trade amongst member nations will be made. 
The research methodology will be formulated in a manner that will clearly answer research 
questions.  
 
 
1.8 Overview of the Remaining Chapters  
 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review on the WTO’s multilateral approach and how subsidies cause agricultural 
trade distortions. The study will explore available literature on the subject of subsidies and 
assess how multilateral approach can benefits South Africa’s agricultural trade. 
 
Chapter 3 
 AoA in relation to Agricultural Subsidies. The chapter will focus on the AoA and its key 
pillars inte alia market access, domestic support and export competition. The chapter will 
also look at how the AoA is responding to distortion of trade through agricultural subsidies 
largely between developing countries such as South Africa, Brazil, and India and developed 
countries such as the EU and the US, this will help asses whether the current WTO law has 
loopholes that nations can exploit to continue to enjoy unduly benefits through trade 
distortion. 
 
 Chapter 4 
The chapter will deal with South Africa’s vision for Agricultural Development through the 
National Development Plan and the New Growth Path and the challenges of world trade law. 
 
Chapter 5 
The Chapter will deal with the latest development in the WTO Round of Ministerial 
Conference, A special focus on the Bali Ministerial Conference, which is the 9th and the latest 
Round of negotiations and decisions on the global trade issues in the WTO. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review on the World Trade Organisation’s Multilateral Approach on trade 
distorting agricultural subsidies from the Doha development agenda to the Bali 
Ministerial Conference.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a review of relevant literature regarding agricultural subsidies, this is 
essentially a comprehensive synthesis of various scholarly views on the subject. The study 
will apply the criticality of thought on the impact that agricultural subsidies have on South 
Africa’s agricultural comparative advantage. The South African trade policy as reviewed in 
2007 will be discussed to assess the lessons learnt by South Africa on the reforms that were 
undertaken by the then first democratically elected government in 1994. The study will 
further look at whether or not and to what extent has the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) 
trade liberation policy yielded advantages for South Africa and other developing countries at 
large. South Africa’s major trading agreements such as the Trade, Development and 
Cooperation Agreement with the European Union will also be analysed. 
The study draws upon various methods of analysis of international trade law as a component 
of international law of treaties as stipulated by the Vienna Conventions of Law of Treaties 
(VCLT). It also draws from general global trade patterns as they relate to key priorities and 
interests of trading partners, especially between developing and developed countries, 
however chapter 3 will go in further details in terms of such comparison.  
International trade analysts typically frame the debate around agricultural subsidies as 
whether the WTO has capacity and willpower to take on the developed countries, in order to 
level the playing field on the agricultural sector where developing countries such as South 
Africa have comparative advantage. 
Since the WTO has become more of a legally binding trade institution, it becomes even more 
imperative for member states to understand the interpretation of treaties in pursuit of levelling 
the playing field between developed and developing countries. The interpretation of treaties 
is covered under Article 31 of the VCLT.31 The WTO jurisprudence is designed to balance 
the scales of justice where political and economic interests are deemed to be unable to strike a 
                                                 
31 Article 21 states that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith and in accordance with the meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty. Vienna Convention was concluded on 23 May 1969. 
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fair balance. 
It is in the spirit of fairness based not only on the ideology of globalisation but also on 
rigorous intellectual debates, as there are always divergent views between trading partners. 
The literature will deal with such divergent views both from the scholarly perspective and 
from the trading partners’ perspective with a view to seek sustainable solution in the ever- 
complex global trading regime. 
2.2 South Africa’s trade policy and its position on Agricultural subsidies 
Agriculture can be a key pathway out of poverty hence ensuring growth in agriculture to 
maximise ways to benefits poor people should be a major policy priority. The politics of 
policy processes surrounding agricultural development have been a bone of contention in the 
WTO’s multilateral negotiations. South Africa’s department of trade and industry through its 
International Trade and Economic Development (ITED) division, decided to relook at South 
Africa’s trade policy in 2007.  
This was informed by the experience and lessons learnt from the reform process which was 
initiated by the then new democratic government in 1994. The main objectives of the policy 
review were to ensure that the trade policy was driving the overall objective of inclusive 
economic growth and development, poverty reduction through sustainable employment and 
the provision of decent jobs. 
The policy of trade liberalisation and market deregulation paved the way for South Africa to 
be part of the global trade system. The adverse part of the policy has been such that global 
trading system consists of global players such as the European Union (EU) and the United 
States (US) who are still highly subsidised and protected. This creates an imbalanced 
competitive landscape considering that the South African agricultural sector is increasingly 
export oriented. 
International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC)32 whose structure and mandate is 
defined in the International Trade Administration Act of 200233. ITAC implements and 
                                                 
32 ITAC is responsible for conducting trade remedy investigations in accordance with policy, domestic law and 
regulations consistent with the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
33 International Trade Administration Act, 2002. No 71 : The act established the International Trade 
Administration Commission to provide  for continued control of import and export of goods and amendment of 
custom duties and other matters connected therewith. 
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administers tariff policy in South Africa through established legislation and, regulation and 
procedure. The ITAC is tasked with the responsibility to act expeditiously both against unfair 
trade such as subsidies and dumped products and any increase in imports that may harm or 
threaten local industries. 
Subsidies and dumping are major issues, which developing countries view as impediments 
against developmental agenda that should be driven at multilateral level. This is emphasized 
by the call to eliminate direct export subsidies and dumping as well as to extend special 
differential treatment for the least developed countries (LDC).34 The WTO through its 
Ministerial talks has since failed to deliver on its own commitment to have subsidies halved 
by 2010 and to completely eradicate subsidies by 2013.  
The Bali Ministerial Round in December 2013 may have been hailed as the great success on 
various issues, however it also failed to concretely address the elimination of agricultural 
export subsidies. The strong criticism remain deeply rooted on the Agreement on Agriculture 
(AoA), which has always been viewed as one sided in favour of developed countries as it 
allows them to continue to heavily support their agricultural sectors.35 The conduct of those 
developed countries such as the US and the EU that subsidise their agricultural sectors unduly 
constrain the ability of developing countries to pursue their agricultural development policies. 
Since South Africa recalibrated its trade policy, it has applied a more strategic trade policy 
orientation that required preservation and expansion of policy space in bilateral, regional and 
multilateral agreements. This is clearly demonstrated in the conclusion of the protracted 
Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC) and the EU Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) negotiations in the 2014.  
The agreement provides greater scope for domestic policies including the use of export taxes 
and safeguard as well as support of regional integration. 
 It is noteworthy to mention that South African exporters have improved market access into 
                                                 
34 Barker D (2007) “The Rise and Predictable Fall of Globalized Industrial Agriculture”. 
San Francisco, April. International Forum on Globalization 
http://ifg.org/pdf/IFG-10_Key_WTO_Reforms.pdf. 
35 Díaz-Bonilla E. Ron J.F.  Food security, price volatility and trade: some reflections for developing countries, 
ICTSD Programme on Agricultural Trade and Sustainable Development Issue Paper No. 28. 2010 International 
Centre for Sustainable Trade and Development, Geneva. 
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Europe in both agricultural and agro-processed products under this new trading regime.36 
South Africa also obtained protection in the EU for geographical indicators, or names of 
origin, such as ‘Rooibos’ ‘Honey bush’ and "Karoo Lamb", while reciprocating protection for 
an extensive array of European wines and food products.37 
The US on the other hand remains a key market for South African products and through the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA),38 South Africa including its partners in the 
Southern African Custom Union (SACU) supply non-fuel goods in the US. A number of 
industries such as the motor, edible fruits and wine have flourished as exports to the US were 
$8.5 billion in 2013 and thousands of jobs have been created.39 AGOA has been extended 
beyond 2015 despite various US lobbying groups who have been opposing South Africa’s 
inclusion to AGOA due to anti-dumping duties imposed on the US poultry industry by South 
Africa. 
 
2.3 Subsidies for Development 
International trade presents great potential for enabling inclusive and sustainable economic 
development. This is clearly articulated in the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), where development of equitable and mutually advantageous 
international trade can help to create good basis to strengthen peace and promotes higher 
living standards and more rapid economic progress for all.40 
Developed countries have used agricultural subsidies for decades and as such agricultural 
subsidies have been a bone of contention and a major focus of international trade relations in 
trade negotiations. Developing countries have been pushing for substantial reductions in trade 
distorting support that producers have been benefiting from in developed countries 
particularly in the EU and the US. WTO rules and disciplines, both in the Uruguay Round 
                                                 
36 Vickers B Towards a Trade Policy for Development: The Political Economy of South Africa’s external trade 
1994-2014. Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol. 36, No 2 
37 DTI (2014) "Conclusion of the Economic Partnership Agreement". (Available at: 
http://www.tralac.org/news/article/5900-conclusion-of-the-economic- partnership-agreement.html, accessed on 
6 August 2014). 
38 AGOA was signed into law on May 18, 2000 as Title 1 of Trade and development Act of 200. The Act 
provides duty-free and quota-free treatment for eligible apparel articles made in qualifying sub-Saharan African 
countries through 2015. 
39 Bolton T The State of the South African poultry industry.  
40 UNCTAD Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, vol. I (New York, Sales 
no. 64.II.B.11, United Nations publication 1964).  
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Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) and in the draft Doha Round agreement, were designed 
to address what was generally considered to be the main problem – subsidies in the EU and 
the US.41 
Developing countries made it clear in the WTO general Council in 2004 that they need to be 
able to pursue agricultural policies that are supportive of their developmental goals, poverty 
reduction strategies and food security.42 The AoA limits a country’s domestic support 
policies through commitments based on the Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS), 43 
however countries are allowed to exempt de minimis AMS. Developing countries de minimis 
level for a product – specific exempt support is 10 percent of the value of each product’s 
production and 10 percent of the value of total agricultural production for non-product-
specific support.44 
Rural development in South Africa and in in many emerging and developing countries has 
always and remains the emphasis of government policy, often to provide water and electricity 
as well as fertilisers and fuel subsidies, this is done to assist with yield increases and 
mechanisation. This act cannot necessarily be classified as being trade distorting, since it is 
aimed at providing infrastructure in rural areas but for policies that are clearly trade distorting 
they can be accommodated under the exception in the Development box45 
2.3.1 Development Measures 
The developmental box provision (article 6 (2)) exempts three types of subsidies from 
reduction commitments. These subsidies include investment subsidies, which are generally 
available to agriculture in developing countries, input subsidies are generally available to low 
–income producers in developing countries, and payment to diversify from drug production. 
Article 6.2 of the AoA also exempt three types of measures from the calculation of AMS of 
developing countries and those are green box measures, blue box measures and de minimis 
exemption. 
                                                 
41 DTB Associates LLP Domestic support and WTO Obligations in Key Developing Countries. 
https://www.usarice.com/doclib/193/186/5652.pdf p.3. 
42 WTO General Council 2004 WT/L/579  
43 The AMS is  the indicator on which the domestic support discipline on Agriculture is based. It is determined 
by calculating market price support estimate for each commodity receiving such support, plus non-exempt direct 
payments or any other subsidy not exempted from reduction commitments. 
44 Mathews A Food Security and WTO Domestic Support Disciplines post –Bali. Issue Paper No. 51 p. 4. 
45 Development box is covered under Article 6.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and is referred to as special 
and differential treatment. 
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The developmental hopes have been boosted by the creation of BRICS46bank, which 
promises to reform the global development architecture. BRICS countries have a critical role 
in promoting equitable and sustainable development. In the case of South Africa it is 
extremely worrying that evidence still points at the reality that unless inequality is actively 
and immediately addressed, more than a million additional people will be pushed into 
extreme poverty by 2020, notwithstanding the GDP47 growth.48  
It is also for that reason why WTO law should seek to actively and immediately address 
inequality in international trade. The post 2015 developmental framework should seek to 
drive the elimination of agricultural subsidies in order to address the unbalanced approach of 
compelling other countries to liberalise while the rich countries subsidise agricultural 
production. 
  Since modern constitutionalism to some extent is no longer defined by nation states,49 it 
means that problems may arise in transnational politics or even outside institutionalised 
politics such as in the private sectors of global society. A stronger WTO with a balanced 
representation between developed and developing countries informed by international law 
based on balancing the scales of justice will be able to drive the developmental agenda. 
2.3.2 Green Box Measures 
The fundamental requirement for exempt measures to qualify for exclusion from reduction 
commitment is that they have no trade-distorting effects. Such policies must be rendered 
under the auspices of government-funded programmes that do not involve transfer from 
consumers. The green box applies to both developed and developing countries.  
Some of the measures listed in Annex 2 of the AoA include: general services, including 
research, pest and disease control, training extension, inspection, marketing, promotional and 
infrastructural services. Direct payment to producers, including decoupled income support, 
income insurance and safety net programmes, disaster relief, investment aids, environmental 
programmes and regional assistance programmes. 
                                                 
46 The Association of five emerging national economies, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. 
47 Gross Domestic Product is one primary indicator used to measure the health of the country’s economy. It 
represents the total currency value of all goods and services produced over a specific period of time. 
48 Gower R Pearce K & Raworth K ‘ Left behind by the G20? How inequality and environmental degradation 
threaten to exclude poor people from the benefits of economic growth’ Briefing Paper Oxfam http://oxf.am/4VZ 
49 Grimm D (2005) The constitution in the process of denationalization, Constellations 12: 447–463. 
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2.3.3 Blue Box measures 
 
These measures come as direct payments under production-limiting programmes, however 
are only exempt from the reduction commitment if such payments are based on fixed area 
and yield, it has to be made on 85 percent or less of the base level of production. The Blue 
Box is set in Article 6(5)(a), which defines the conditions for qualification as a Blue Box 
measure. The Blue Box represent the US/EU deal struck with the Blair House Accord 50 
 
There are other main AoA provisions such as Article 6(5) b, which excludes Blue Box 
measure as well as Article 13(b) which is about due restraint which treats the Blue Box as an 
Amber for actionability. The comprehensive synthesis on box measures will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter three under the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA).  
 
2.3.4 Agricultural subsidies reforms 
 
Trade distorting support ceilings currently included in the proposed modalities for 
agriculture51 is said to reduce the possible limit for developed countries from $247 billion to 
$60 billion but allow developing countries to provide $165 billion in trade distorting 
support.52 This demonstrates a major shift in domestic support for agriculture away from the 
developed countries towards the emerging and developing countries. There is however a 
surging suspicion that developed countries are simply ‘shifting boxes’ in other words are 
reducing domestic support from amber box but increasing subsidies in green box. 
The reforms in CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) in the EU have resulted in the decline of 
domestic support in amber box from €50 billion in 1995 to €30.8 billion in 2003 and further 
reduced to €6.5 billion in 2010.53 It is however interesting to note that domestic support in 
green box increased from €9.2 billion in 1995 to €20.4 billion in 2003 and reached €68 
                                                 
50 The 1992 deal creating this box known as the ‘Blair House Accord’ (after the Washington DC location where 
it was reached), meant that subsidies whereby farmers are paid based on setting aside parts of their  fields, are 
exempt from AMS reduction commitments. 
51 World Trade Organisation ‘Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture’TN/AG/W/4 Rev 4, Vommittee on 
Agriculture, Special session, 6 December 2008. 
52 Brink L ‘Evolution of  Trade-distorting  Domestic Support’ in tackling  agriculture in the post Bali Contexts, 
Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development. 2014 
53 Banga R Impact of Green Box Subsidies on Productivity, Production and International Trade June 2014. 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ecidc2014misc1_bp10.pdf (accessed on the 15 May 2015) 
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billion in 2010.54 The US Farm Bill of 201455 eliminates direct and countercyclical payments 
to farmers, however it expanded crop insurance programs for risk-management. The domestic 
support in amber box increased from $6.2 billion in 1995 to $9.6 billion in 2002 and declined 
to $6.2 billion in 2008 and reached $4.1 billion in 2010. While green box subsidies increased 
from $46 billion in 1995 to $ 58.3 billion in 2002 reaching $120 billion in 2010.56  
The strong element of distrust between developed and developing nations, particularly 
African countries emanates from the economic effects of colonialism. The integration of 
Africa into the capitalist system meant that Africa functioned primarily as a source of raw 
materials for western industrial production.57 This meant the total re-organisation of the 
African agricultural economy as it altered the way people produce. The result of the 
neoliberal approach from structural adjustment programmes (SAP) which facilitated trade 
liberalisation have causes unequal exchange and distorted the balance of trade.58 
 
Developing countries have continued to argue in the WTO as well as in the Bretton Woods 
institutions (World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) that economic shifts that have 
accompanied structural adjustment programmes and the lowering of trade barriers have been 
detrimental to the least developed and developing countries.  
 
Trade liberalisation is a neo-liberal approach by the WTO to promote global trade and 
stability, the study will also look at the dichotomy between the interests of South Africa as 
part of developing world and those of developed countries and to what extent has trade 
liberalisation limited policy space for South Africa’s own policy determination. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 Banga R Impact of Green Box Subsidies on Productivity, Production and International Trade p8. 
55 The US Farm Bill of 2014 is the 2014 Agricultural Act, which was approved by both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, albeit with a large numbers of dissenting votes in both chambers of the 
Congress and was finally signed into law by President Obama on February 7, 2014. 
56 Banga R Impact of Green Box Subsidies on Productivity, Production and International Trade p10. 
57 Farah I, Kiamba S,& Mazongo K Strategies to confront the Challenges of the 21st Century: Does Africa have 
what is required? Berlin, 14th-17th July 2011.www.culturaldemocracy.org p.3. 
58 Alkali RA International Relations and Nigeria’s Foreign Policy (Kaduna, North Point Publihers,2003) 
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2.4 World Trade Organisation’s on Trade Liberalisation  
 
Agriculture is one of the most contentious issues in the multilateral trade forums, hence the 
multilateral trading rules were envisaged to discourage trade-distorting agricultural subsidies 
within domestic policies of each member state.  Trade liberalisation has been driven or at 
least projected as a tool to integrate global trade for the benefit of all WTO member states 
irrespective of whether they are classified as least developed, developing or developed 
countries. 
 
 
The goals of the WTO comprise of non-discrimination between trading partners, 
discouragement of distorting practices, benefit to developing countries and fairer 
competition.59 This is informed also by its objectives that are mainly concerned inter alia 
about raising standards of living, ensuring growth in output and trade as well as the optimal 
use of the world resources while ensuring sustainable development. 
Various non-governmental organisations and community lobby groups have raised concerns 
on the domination of WTO law scholarship by trade law scholars from the developed world. 
One article looked specifically at regulatory framework for international trade,60specifically 
the generally ignored GATT articles.61The emphasis that trade should inextricably be tied to 
development should continue to be the centre stage in the global trade discourse and that 
developing nations should have policy space in order to pursue their own priorities pertaining 
to their industrial development policies. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
59 WTO WTO Annual Report (2010) http://www.supermarket.co.za/SR_Downloads/S&R%202015-
3%20Poultry.pdf. 
60 Lee Y Reclaiming Development in the World Trading System (2006). 
61 XVIII (‘Government Assistance to Economic Development’), GATT Articles XXXVI-XVIII (‘Trade and 
Development’) and ‘the Enabling Clause’ which provides the general legal basis for special and differential 
treatment. 
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This assertion is highly amplified by some economists who dared to challenge such 
conventional approach to development. 
Like the ancient questers, we economists have tried to find precious object, the key 
that would enable the poor tropics to become rich. We thought we had found the elixir 
many different times. The precious objects we offered ranged from foreign aid to 
investment in machines, from fostering education to controlling population growth, 
from giving loans conditional on reforms to giving debt relief conditional on reforms. 
None of them has delivered as promised.62  
The assertion made by the above statement once again reinforces the call to look at current 
regulatory framework for international trade, particularly GATT Articles XXXVI-XXXVIII 
(Trade and development), GATT Article XVIII (Government Assistance to Economic 
Development) and the enabling clause, which essentially provides the general legal basis for 
special and differential treatment. One other aspect is that Sub Saharan African countries 
have liberalised trade policies since 1980s, while there may be cross-country evidence that 
exports are associated with growth, other research models suggest that opening trade 
generally leads to unfair income distribution because it benefits certain areas in export 
industries by allowing them to sell at higher prices internationally, whereas certain areas in 
import tend to lose63  
There are however many dissenting views to the above statement such as the literature that 
advances the idea that trade liberalisation accelerates economic growth.64 Another interesting 
view is that the growth linkage between agricultural trade and poverty reduction can be 
effective when such growth is driven by broad –based productivity through technological 
innovation.65 The study that was conducted on 22 developing countries revealed that the 
adoption of trade liberalisation policies stimulated both export and import growth, and 
therefore concluded that trade liberalisation must have had a net positive effect on the 
                                                 
62 Easterly W The Elusive Quest for Growth (2001) XII. 
 
63 Krugerman PR,  Obstfeld M & Meliitz MJ International economics: Theory and policy 9ed (2012). 
64 Dollar D & Kraay A Growth is good for the poor. (2002) World Bank Development Research Group Position 
Paper, available at  http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/22015_Growth_is_Good_for_Poor.pdf 
(accessed 13 May 2015) 
65 Popli GK ‘Trade liberalization and the self-employed in Mexico’ (2010) 38(6) Elsevier - World Development 
803-813. 
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economic growth in those countries researched over three decades.66  
The legal framework for international trade becomes directly relevant to social development, 
this is largely because it does not only regulate trade conduct of member states, but also 
directly interfere with the ability of developing countries to adopt their own effective 
development policies. The study proposes that developing countries be allowed through 
WTO articles on trade and development to pursue a policy of development via import 
substitution.67  
The provisions of such policy include the protection of infant industries in developing 
countries and opening up of markets for agricultural export opportunities for developing 
countries. These are the very same provisions that helped developed countries to prosper. The 
study supports the hypothesis that since there are very few trade law scholars from 
developing countries in the WTO law scholarship, priorities of developed countries will 
continue to prevail in the WTO law scholarship over those of developing countries.  
The system remains far from a neutral technocratic process in its structure and operation.68 
Large developed countries are viewed as much better positioned to take advantage of the 
resource-demanding legalised system than resource-challenged developing countries. The 
power and influence of the Western countries in the WTO remain rather intact and therefore 
resistance on certain concessions that will enable developing countries’ agricultural 
comparative advantage will continue to be delayed. 
In the case of South Africa, the period between 1990 and 2001 South Africa liberalised (both 
unilaterally and multilaterally) on a large scale in areas of domestic support and export 
subsidies.69 The reforms were part of the vision of the WTO’s trade liberalisation that South 
Africa is part of, however that has not been the case in other WTO member countries such as 
the EU and the United States (US), these countries still protect their agricultural sectors 
through export subsidies. This limits welfare gains for developing countries with comparative 
                                                 
66 Santos-Paulino A & Thirlwall AP ‘The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Exports, Imports and the Balance of 
Payments of Developing Countries’ (2004) 114 Economic Journal 50. 
67 Import Substitution is trade and economic policy that advocates replacing foreign imports with domestic 
production- this is based on the premise that a country should attempt to reduce its foreign dependency through 
local production of industrialised products. 
68 Shaffer G How to make the WTO DSU work for Developing Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country 
Strategies (2003) 5 ICTSD Resource Paper.   
69 Chitiga M,  Kandiero T& Ngwenya P ‘Agricultural Trade Policy Reform in South Africa’ (2008) 47(1) 
Agrekon 76-101. 
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advantage in agriculture. 
It is however important to note that domestic support measures under amber box70 and blue 
box71 in developed countries. The total aggregate measure of support (AMS) 72drastically 
declined for all developed countries in 2010 relative to 1995. The US total AMA declined 
from US$ 6.2 billion in 1995 to US$ 4.1 billion in 2010, while the EU reduced its AMS from 
€50.1 billion to €6.5 billion and Japan’s AMS declined from ¥3,507 billion to ¥565 billion.73 
It seems however that the decline in Amber Box and Blue subsidies has been compensated by 
drastic increases in Green Box subsidies. The US increased its Green Box subsidies from 
US$ 46 billion in 1995 to US$ 120 billion in 2010, while the EU hiked its subsidies from 
€9.2 billion to €68 billion. This suggests that there has been some ‘Box shifting’ of subsidies 
on the part of both the US and the EU. 
It therefore becomes critical for the WTO to investigate whether the box shifting of subsidies 
comply with basic principles of being minimal production and trade distorting as required by 
the Green Box. The post Bali work program should look at some of these practices that are 
reversing the WTO progress and delaying the developmental agenda of developing countries. 
Studies also support the notion that the country’s own domestic reforms are important.74 
Since there are major distortions in agricultural trade at the global level, it is safe to mention 
that further gains for developing countries will be derived from a substantial reduction of 
existing export subsidies and the eradication of other trade impediments such as exclusion of 
developing countries in key decision making process in the WTO by developed countries 
such as the EU and the US. 
The analysis of the most violently protested Third Ministerial Conference in Seattle reveals 
that the manipulation and distortion of the entire ‘multilateral negotiating process’ in Seattle 
was so blatant under the overall control of the US in collaboration with the WTO Secretariat, 
                                                 
70 Amber Box-all domestic support measures which distort production and trade. 
71 Blue –Box –any domestic support measure that would normally be in the amber box, is placed in the Green 
Box, Green being the domestic support measures which are not trade distorting. 
72 AMS combines all supports for specified products and those that are not product specific into single figure. 
73 Banga R The impact of Green Box subsidies on agricultural productivity, production and international trade 
(2014) 4. 
 
74 Gorter H, Ingco M & Ruiz L Export Subsidies and Domestic Support Measures (2000) World Bank: 
Washington.   
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that it provoked an unprecedented open ‘revolt’ from the developing countries75. The lack of 
political will and leadership on the part of the US and the EU to forge the compromises that 
would have enabled the launch of a new round was largely to blame.76  The lack of 
commitment on the part of the key western countries meant that developing countries had 
little opportunity to promote their proposals due to processes even more exclusionary, non-
transparent and contrived than usual in the WTO.  
It is however encouraging that the progress made since the Third Ministerial Conference to 
the Ninth Ministerial Conference in Bali has been substantial. The Fourth Ministerial 
Conference in Doha on the ninth until the fourteenth of November 2001 laid a foundation to 
what was then referred to as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). The key points relating 
to agriculture that were encapsulated were to further negotiate to achieve substantial 
improvements in the market access, reduce with a view of phasing out, all forms of export 
subsidies.77 
It was only in December 2013 in Bali, Indonesia; during the Ninth Ministerial Conference 
(Bali Ministerial Conference) that substantial progress was made. The final agreement that is 
now referred to as the Bali package consists of three pillars which are trade facilitation, 
agricultural issues which covers public stockholding for food security purposes, 
understanding on Tariff Rate Quota Administration Provisions of Agricultural Products 
,export competition  and the other aspect of the agreement  is more about development 
focused provisions. 78 
The main objective particularly for developing countries is to enable developing countries to 
trade with the developed world in the global markets.  The lowering of import tariffs and 
agricultural subsidies would enable developing countries more market access in developed 
countries’ markets.  The Bali package came closer than any other round of talks in achieving 
such objectives, hence it reignited hope for developing countries but most of all it provided a 
platform towards restoring the credibility of the WTO. 
                                                 
75 Hormeku T ‘Seattle: Dirty tactics backfire’ (2000) African Agenda- January/February 2000. 
76 A number of political events such as the election campaign that was underway in the US, the debate around 
the naming of the new WTO Director general at the time as well as the then new European Commission as a 
result of scandals in Europe, such events contributed largely to the ill preparedness of EU and US negotiators to 
launch  new negotiations. 
77 WTO Rules on Agriculture (Paragraph 13) 
78 Bellmann C ‘The Bali Agreement: Implications for Development and the WTO’ (2014) 6 (1) Development 
Policy / Revue Internationale de Politique de Développement. 
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It is however interesting that some of the views from developing countries support the status 
quo of the multilateral system at the WTO, but they simply call for the reforms in the WTO 
for greater transparency and inclusiveness. This is largely because most developing countries 
recognise the threat of the return to big power pressures and unilateralism if the WTO rule-
based multilateralism were to be phased out or not recognized by developing countries as 
well as those who feel aggrieved by the system79. 
The reform of the functioning of the WTO is not all that is needed. ‘Access’ to information, 
‘consultation’ and even greater ‘participation’, while essential, are certainly not sufficient 
where it is inequalities of resources, skills, experience and power that weigh heavily in 
multilateral negotiations.80 The study found that much more is needed in transforming the 
structures and modus operandi of the WTO, starting from the basis of more vigilance by 
developing countries about the underlying purposes and largely illusory effects of such partial 
‘reform’ processes. 
The complexities of the contemporary global world not to mention the global trading system, 
demand leaders or representatives of sovereign developing countries to have ingenuity, sound 
judgment and effectiveness. The need for developing countries to invest on the expertise of 
the WTO modus operandi especially the WTO law scholarship becomes urgent and 
imperative. This will enable developing countries to create a formidable platform for reforms 
in the institution as well as increase their bargaining power in the WTO law scholarship.  
It is however clear from the literature,81that it would be challenging to draw conclusions on 
whether or not or to what extent has developing countries benefited from trade liberation, as 
it is difficult to gather empirical evidence unless we look at each country specific.    
The next   sub-topic will look specifically in the case of South Africa with regards to trade 
liberalisation benefits as well as how agricultural subsidies have distorted or benefited South 
Africa global trade position.   
 
                                                 
79 Erwin A& Pagrotsky L ‘Widen the world trade inclusion zone - WTO members must accept shared 
responsibility for the promotion of global growth’ (1999) in the Financial Times, London, 18 November 1999 
edition.  
80 Das BL ‘Building on Seattle, after stopping the steamroller’ (2000) 225 Third World Economics 16-31. 
 
81 Easterly W The Elusive Quest for Growth (2001) XII. 
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2.5 South Africa ‘s Trade Liberalisation within the agricultural sector 
 
The economic and classic trade theory tells us that trade liberalisation leads to welfare-
enhancing trade creations as well as trade diversion, which adversely affect welfare.82The 
calculation of the gains from establishing a free trade area, depend on the following: 
a) The size and extent of trade barriers prior to entering the free trade agreement; 
b) The trade shares of each country as a trading partner in a liberalized situation; 
c) The degree to which the effect of removing barriers to trade between members results 
in more or less access overall by trading partners to the free trade area; and 
d) The degree to which trade diversion occurs, i.e. the extent to which a reduction in 
trade barriers between the partner countries causes industries to expand that are 
relatively high cost on a global scale83. 
Trade theory also tells us that developing countries, since they tend to be endowed with land, 
labour and natural resources rather than with capital and technology should have comparative 
advantage in agriculture. Many developing countries rely only on a small set of agricultural 
commodities, which in most cases are highly subsidised in OECD (Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. The EU as South Africa’s most strategic 
trading partner has the highest level of agricultural protection among the OECD countries.84 
The policy bias against agriculture in developing countries has often been so severe.85 It is so 
biased that it favours the interest of developed countries over developing countries. The 
misguided agricultural, fiscal and investment policies have also contributed to the bias.86 It is 
therefore argued that trade reforms alone will be insufficient to remove the bias against 
agriculture.  
In the 1990s South Africa adopted a two-pronged approach to trade liberalisation, which 
                                                 
82 Lipsey RG ‘The Theory of Custom Unions: Trade Diversion and Welfare’ (1957)24(93) Economica 40-46.  
83 Baltzer K, Frandsen SE & Jensen HG ‘European Free Trade Areas as an alternative to Doha - Impacts of US, 
Russia and Chinese FTAs’(2007) 2. 
84 Ament A Agricultural Trade Liberalisation and Protection: Impact of Agricultural Protection and 
Liberalisation on South Africa (2006) Unpublished Thesis: Budapest. 
85 See generally Bautista R ‘Price and trade policies for agricultural development’ (1990) 13 (1) The World 
Economy 89-109. 
86 See generally McKay A, Morrissey O & Vaillant C ‘Trade Liberalization and Agricultural Supply Response: 
Issues and Lessons’ (1997) 9 (2) European Journal of Development Research 129-147.  
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included unilateral trade liberation (South Africa’s own trade liberalisation) and the 
multilateral trade liberation (Trade liberation in the context of Uruguay Round). The years 
between 1990 and 1994 were typified by trade liberation, which resulted in the reduction of 
average tariff from 28% to 16% while import surcharge was eliminated completely.87 
In 1994, South Africa announced a schedule of unilateral tariff liberalisation that went 
beyond the Uruguay Round commitments. This resulted in the country’s tariffs declining 
from 16% in 1994 to 10% in 1998. In the context of Uruguay Round, South Africa made a 
tariff offer which was to be phased over 5 years, effectively from January 1995; this was 
largely to reduce the number of tariff lines by 15% in the first year and by 30% by 1999.88  
Apart from South Africa’s efforts to foster trade integration, it is important to understand that 
complementary policies from trading partners are required to ensure effective global trade 
reforms. This will enable significant export-led growth and diversification, which has been a 
slow process thus far. The Bali Round of talks has however provided a platform that promises 
sustainable, broad-based economic growth in that its intent is collective partnership that is 
inclusive of development country’s developmental needs. 
The hypothesis that trade liberalisation is beneficial to the dynamic efficiency of South Africa 
was tested in South Africa in 2001.89Although a lot more research has been done after that 
however this study was critical and remains relevant largely because openness is still viewed 
as reducing the cost of adopting foreign technology, which in turn improves productivity and 
growth. This is important especially from a policy perspective because trade liberalisation is 
one aspect that the government uses to maximize economic gains and from research 
perspective it becomes important to examine how South African experience differs from 
other developing countries. 
The study tested the proposition using various methods (cross section approach and aggregate 
time series approach). The study concluded that the approaches validated the proposition that 
indeed trade liberalisation has contributed significantly to augmenting South Africa’s growth 
potential. The critical outcome of the study is that the results however suggest that an open 
                                                 
87 Cassim R & van Seventer D ‘Reform of South Africa’s Merchandise Trade since Democracy, an Overview’ 
(2006) University of the Witwatersrand: Johannesburg. 
88 Jonsson G & Subramanian A Dynamic gains from trade evidence from South Africa (2001) 48(1) IMF Staff 
Paper. URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/2001/01a/pdf/jonsson.pdf  (Accessed 16 May 2015) 
89 Jonsson G & Subramanian A Dynamic gains from trade evidence from South Africa (2001) 48(1) IMF Staff 
Paper. URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/2001/01a/pdf/jonsson.pdf  (Accessed 16 May 2015). 
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environment needs to be complemented by appropriate avenues for the creation and 
absorption of technology.90 A further refining and deepening research agenda was suggested 
despite such encouraging findings. 
The alternative study argued against the empirical evidence that seems to affirm that trade 
liberalisation contributes to growth that leads to welfare gains. The authors91 diametrically 
oppose the widely promoted view by multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Organisation for Economic Corporation and 
Development (OECD) that openness generates predictable and positive consequence for 
growth. They argued that despite the fact that trade policies do affect the volume of trade, 
there is however no reason to expect their effect on growth to be qualitatively similar to the 
consequences of changes in trade volumes that arise from increases in world demands.92 
The literature on the alternative study93 reminds us that growth and welfare are not the same, 
therefore even if trade policies that restrict international trade were to reduce economic 
growth, they will not necessarily reduce the level of welfare. The study concluded by 
acknowledging that the effects of trade liberalisation may be on the balance, beneficial on 
standard comparative-advantage grounds.  
The study however disputed very strongly the assertion that integration into the world 
economy is such a potent force for economic growth, that it can be interpreted as a substitute 
for development strategy.94 South Africa, like most developing countries faces the risk of 
declining terms of trade. The world prices of the primary commodities, especially agriculture 
tend to fall overtime relative to the price of the manufactures South Africa imports. The 
volatility of world prices for primary commodities (including agricultural) poses a risk to 
South Africa, since such prices are determined in markets beyond the influence of individual 
                                                 
90 Jonsson G & Subramanian AIMF Working Paper Dynamic gains from trade: Evidence from South Africa 
march 2000  p29. 
91 See Rodriguez R and Rodrik D ‘Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic's Guide to the Cross-National 
Evidence’ in Bernanke BS & Rogoff K NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000 - Volume 15(2001) MIT Press: 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
92 See Rodriguez R and Rodrik D ‘Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic's Guide to the Cross-National 
Evidence’ in Bernanke BS & Rogoff K NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000 - Volume 15(2001) 63ff. 
93 See Rodriguez R and Rodrik D ‘Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic's Guide to the Cross-National 
Evidence’ in Bernanke BS & Rogoff K NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000 - Volume 15(2001)63ff. 
94See Rodriguez R and Rodrik D ‘Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic's Guide to the Cross-National 
Evidence’ in Bernanke BS & Rogoff K NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000 - Volume 15(2001) 63ff. 
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developing country.95 
In South Africa average protection has fallen while openness increased, macroeconomic 
performance in this era of liberalisation has been unimpressive, as the gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth remained insufficient to impact on high levels of unemployment. Authors 
however made an assertion that trade liberalisation may not have any appreciable impact on 
poverty in the short run, however poverty does reduce in the long run.96 
Some of the benefits of trade liberalisation are that it promotes greater efficiency as it 
encourages the reallocation of domestic resources, away from relatively inefficient 
production of importable goods towards increased production of exportable goods.97 The 
second benefit is that it reduces the price and increases the variety of imported goods 
available to consumers and therefore trade expands the consumption possibilities in the 
country.98 
Some countries may not benefit at all in the short run and liberalisation is likely to impose 
costs on some developing countries. There are many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that 
have liberalised their trade policies, however evidence that liberalisation increases growth is 
much weaker than fairly convincing cross-country evidence that exports are associated with 
growth.99 
The effect of trade liberalisation on long-run GDP works via three channels. The first one 
was that openness reduces the cost of adopting foreign technology by limiting barriers to 
technology transfer, and productivity increases. The second one was that lower tariffs imply 
less expensive foreign capital goods, which generates more capital accumulation. The third 
one was that trade liberalisation increases GDP growth indirectly through the endogenous 
                                                 
95 Morrissey O Costs, Benefits and Risks from Trade: Theory and Practice for Food Security (2002) Paper 
presented at the FAO Expert Consultation on Trade and Food Security: Conceptualizing the Linkages, Rome 
11- 12 July 2002. 
96 Mabugu R & Chitiga M South Africa trade liberalization and poverty in a dynamic microsimulation CGE 
model (2007) University of Pretoria Department of Economics Working Paper Series No 2007-18. 
97Morrissey O Costs, Benefits and Risks from Trade: Theory and Practice for Food Security (2002) Paper 
presented at the FAO Expert Consultation on Trade and Food Security: Conceptualizing the Linkages, Rome 
11- 12 July 2002. 
98 Morrissey O Costs, Benefits and Risks from Trade: Theory and Practice for Food Security (2002) Paper 
presented at the FAO Expert Consultation on Trade and Food Security: Conceptualizing the Linkages, Rome 
11- 12 July 2002. 
99 See Greenaway D, Morgan C W & Wright P ‘Trade liberalization and growth in developing countries’ (1997) 
25 (11) World Development 1885-1892.  See also Greenaway D, Morgan C W & Wright P ‘Trade Reform, 
Adjustment and Growth: What does the evidence tell us?’(1998) 108 Economic Journal 1547-1561. 
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interplay between investment and profitability.100 
If one looks at the case of US subsidy dispute, for example, it is unlikely that the US will 
limit its levels of domestic subsidies because that would effectively mean that the US would 
move from the position of being the world’s biggest exporter of corn to being the net corn 
importer. South Africa continues to cry foul as it is denied the position in the world markets 
for agricultural commodities. The continued distortion of developed country markets 
resulting in major rewards for developed countries is a major peril to South African 
agricultural advantage, this therefore raises questions around the logic of reforms in 
agriculture sector. 
The literature as it reflects the juxtaposition of legal and economic realities clearly indicates 
that this is a multi-disciplinary subject. The central focus of this mini thesis shall remain the 
impact of agricultural subsidies on the agricultural export in South Africa. It is however 
critical to understand both the legal and the economic aspects in order to determine whether 
the transactions are within the legal fairness based on the treaties agreed upon in the 
multilateral context in the WTO. 
It is also critical for further studies to unpack all the variables of each discipline (Legal, 
Economic or International Relations) that form part of the comprehensive synthesis of the 
whole study. This will be beneficial in informing policy direction or at least making a 
contribution in this regard. 
The consequences and impacts of agricultural trade liberalisation as it relates to agricultural 
subsidies and other global trade reforms remain the subject of debate and rigorous academic 
as well as analysts’ discourse. Based on the discourse one would believe that trade 
liberalisation’s benefits to welfare of trading partners, are somewhat complex in terms of 
equitable benefits especially for developing countries, the study will go further to examine 
the bilateral agreement between South Africa and the EU to determine welfare gains for 
South Africa. 
The EU is South Africa’s key trading partner that still uses agricultural subsidies as part of 
                                                 
100 Rattso J & Stokke H E Trade Barriers to growth in South Africa: Endogenous investment-productivity-trade 
interaction (2009) Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology: Trondheim.  
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the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)101 and therefore the most relevant to look at since 
agriculture plays a pivotal part of the agreement. The tariff reduction between the two 
countries will also be looked at in terms of the degree of benefits as a result of such tariff 
reduction. 
 
2.5.1 South Africa’s Bilateral Trade Agreement with the European Union 
 
South African Constitution embraces international law and it dictates that the executive 
sphere of government is mandated to negotiate international agreements.102 In the case of the 
Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA), South Africa’s department of 
trade and industry played a pivotal role and once the agreement was signed, it was then 
incorporated into South African law by an act of parliament. 
 
South Africa signed the bilateral Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement  (TDCA) 
with the EU in October 1999. The TDCA consists of two parts, which are the EU and South 
Africa Trade Agreement (EU-SA FTA, which is about creating a free trade area between the 
EU and South Africa and the European Program for Reconstruction and Development 
(EPRD). The EPRD is about the European Union’s financial support to South Africa in terms 
of social service, private sector development, good governance, human rights and regional 
integration.103 
It is critical for South Africa to critically look within EPRD whether it is not in any way a 
form of export subsidy. Subsidies can be in different form such as export finance, which is 
mainly used by developed countries to artificially improve the price competitiveness of their 
exports. In other African countries, mainly least developed countries export subsidies may be 
in the form of food aid, which can be used as a disguise to dispose of surpluses and this may 
damage local production or even compromise trade and development for the recipient 
country.104 
                                                 
101 The Common Agricultural Policy is the agricultural policy of the European Union that implements a system 
of agricultural subsidies and other programmes, it was introduced in 1962 however it has undergone several 
reforms since then 
102 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Sec 231(23)(10) 
103 Lee MC ‘The EU-South Africa Free Trade Agreement: In whose interest?’(2002)20(1) Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies 81-85. 
104 See The Cairns Group Export Subsidies: Detrimental to Developing Country Exports (undated) The Cairns 
Group: Cairns. 
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Free trade was implemented at the beginning of the year 2000, however full implementation 
of the agreement began in May 2004. The two parties (EU and South Africa) agreed that 
South Africa would liberalise 86% of its EU imports in twelve years, while the EU would 
liberalise 95% in ten years.  The other aspect of the agreement was that South Africa would 
remove 81% of duties on EU agricultural imports while 72% of South Africa’s agricultural 
exports would receive preferential treatment in the EU.105  
It should also be noted that although the EU-SA TDCA was signed between EU and South 
Africa it applies de facto to Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS). The BLNS 
countries are part of the Southern Africa Custom Union (SACU) with South Africa and as a 
result have become party to the EU-SA TDCA with respect to imports from the EU.  
It is also for that reason why South Africa should use its influence in the Southern 
hemisphere to drive both the SADC (Southern African Development Community) agenda as 
well as the entire African agenda in the multilateral trading platform. South Africa has sought 
bilateral, free and preferential trade agreements with other countries in Africa, Asia and the 
Middle East, but this section shall focus on the EU-SA TDCA.  
Macroeconomic policies are often influenced by international structures such as the WTO or 
UN on which South Africa is a signatory and has to comply with global treaties. The 
international agreements are complex combinations of competing and conflicting global 
interests with extremely tendentious and contentious processes, comprising of compromises 
and trade-offs, inconsistencies and internal contradictions, imbalances and inequities106 
The reason for this is that each country has its own domestic interests and priorities. Each 
state drives its own policies to achieve its interests and priorities, this makes the global 
negotiating platform a tedious and complex phenomena because it seeks to balance all these 
different interests in order to integrate them for a smooth and sustainable global trade system. 
Bilateral agreements are less complex as the negotiations are between two countries, they 
simply need to ensure that the agreement is within the parameters of the WTO especially if 
both parties are members states of the WTO. 
                                                 
105 WTO Trade policy review: report by the Secretariat of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) (2009) 
World Trade Organization: Geneva.  
106See Das BL The WTO Agreements - Deficiencies, Imbalances and Required Changes (1998) Zed 
Books/Third World Network: Penang. 
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The TDCA between South Africa and EU member countries has enabled South Africa to 
integrate into the world market. Despite challenges faced by some EU member states due to 
economic crisis South African agriculture, fishery and forestry exports to the EU market 
amounted to US$2.5 billion and imports to US$2.7 billion in 2012,107this is indicative that 
South Africa’s exports to the EU exceeded its imports. Netherlands and the UK were on top 
of the list of countries as main export destination for South African agricultural products as 
illustrated by the following trade map. 
Table 2.1: The table below shows the main export destinations for South African 
agricultural products 
 Value in US$ Millions 
Importers 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
World 5773 5701 6522 7318 7116 
EU (28) 2341 1989 2304 2349 2164 
Netherlands 
UK 
Germany 
Italy 
France 
Sweden 
Czech Republic 
733 
588 
248 
163 
81 
94 
39 
539 
571 
240 
132 
72 
93 
17 
689 
609 
273 
177 
89 
100 
50 
717 
599 
268 
263 
77 
98 
59 
700 
602 
243 
168 
90 
81 
48 
Source: Trade Map (2014) 
Despite the trade agreement with the EU, South Africa and other developing countries have 
                                                 
107 See figures in  International Trade Probe, Issue No 49 of January 2014 at 
http://www.namc.co.za/upload/DAFF-NAMC-TradeProbe-Issue-No-49-January-2014.pdf (Accessed 16 May 
2015) 
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been crying foul about the effects of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as well as 
US Farm Bill legislation.  The US Farm Bill is within Amber Box ceiling (Trade distorting 
agricultural support) but it subsidises consumers the most, while EU’s Common Agricultural 
Policy maybe within the Amber Box ceiling (trade distorting agricultural support) but 
subsidises the farmers most. This compromises the agricultural comparative advantage for 
developing countries. 
The CAP also protects European agricultural products. CAP is often criticised for its 
incompatibility with the WTO standards and also for its effect on developing countries. The 
initial objectives of CAP were laid down in the Treaty of Rome. They included five aims: 
1. To raise agricultural productivity, 
2. To ensure fair standard of living for the agricultural community, 
3. To stabilize markets, 
4. To assure availability of supplies and 
5. To ensure that supplies reached consumers at reasonable prices. 
It is however unfortunate that even though most products on the European market can be 
bought at a much lower price on the world market. European consumers are forced to pay 
higher prices in order to subsidies local farmers in the EU. The main failure for policy 
therefore, has been notably in the region of ‘reasonable prices’ since European consumers are 
forced to pay higher prices to subsidies the EU farm subsidies. In essence subsidies adversely 
affect both the local market as they affect foreign trading partners. 
2.6 Sensitive Products 
 
A total of 304 tariff items were left completely outside tariff reductions in EU imports from 
South Africa. South Africa’s list of exceptions includes a total of 120 tariff items, including 
industrial products, agricultural products as well as foodstuffs.108 Since some of the products 
are excluded from the FTA including beef, this essentially means that no preferential access 
to the EU red meat market will be gained. South Africa is a net importer of red meat and 
ideally it can import red meat from its neighbouring countries in order to increase regional 
                                                 
108 Laaksonen K Free Trade Agreements (TDCA) between South Africa and the EU- An exemplar for economic 
partnership agreements (2008) 19. 
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co-operation and development. 
Studies conducted by Red Meat Producers’ Organisation (RPO) indicate that the EU could 
export red meat to South Africa well below local production prices as each kilogram is 
supported by EU export subsidies. The current 40% tariff on red meat imports is not even 
enough to protect local producers. In the FTA agreement the EU expects the South African 
tariffs to be lowered even below the 40% threshold. This could result in serious 
disadvantageous situation for local and neighbouring producers.109 
The Southern African Meat Producers Liaison Committee (SAMPLC), which comprises of 
representatives from South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, looked into 
the threat posed by the EU red meat exports. The committee pointed to the lack of coherence 
in European policy. It is estimated that with EU subsidized beef exports losses incurred by 
subsidized imports far exceeds possible gains from EU developmental assistance transfers.  
In South Africa, about 90% of the remaining support of agricultural products is in the form of 
Market Price Support (MPS) and a small portion is given to farmers based on input use and 
farm income.110 South Africa’s support is mainly in raw sugar, wheat, maize, milk, meat and 
fruit. Most of the support in the EU is also in the form of MPS and is found in sensitive 
products like dairy, cereal, meat products, sugar and some fruit. 
 It was argued that in terms of percentage of Producer Support Estimate (PSE), EU was seven 
times more than in South Africa. The argument goes further to point out that South Africa’s 
liberalisation process is faster than the European Union’s.111 European Union’s agricultural 
commodities, which enter South African market and other developing countries’ markets, are 
heavily subsidized.  
A farmer in the EU receives 50% of its annual income through subsidies, while a farmer in 
South Africa only receives 10% of its annual income through subsidies.112 This essentially 
                                                 
109 Bertelsmann T ‘EU-SA: The Possible Effects on Southern African Agriculture’ (1997) 6 The South African 
Institute of international Affairs-International Policy Update 1-4. 
110 Market price support for a product = (administered price at the farm gate - fixed external reference price) x 
eligible production. Market price support for an input (service) = (administered price at the farm gate - market 
price) x quantity of input (service) receiving subsidy 
111Bauer LN African Regional Integration-The EU-SA Free Trade Agreement (2004) Institut für 
Afrikanistik/University of Leipzig: Leipzig. 
112 Kneifel T ‘Fair Trade or/ and Free Trade? A European NGO-Perspective on Trade Negotiations between 
South Africa and the EU’ (1997) Werkstatt Ökonomie 1-5.  
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means that European producers are able to sell certain products at one-fourth of market price 
and unfortunately South African farmers are not able to compete with this price.113 
Various approaches in the literature looked specifically at the imports, exports and total trade 
between South Africa and the EU. The literature seems to lament that the balance of trade has 
been in favour of the EU throughout the last 10yrs, since South Africa had to liberalise key 
sensitive sectors far more than the EU.114 They argued that South Africa’s merchandise trade 
deficit with the EU worsened in nominal terms after it had improved somewhat during the 
late 1990s.115 This is against the claims made by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
which advocated that policies toward foreign trade are among the more important factors 
promoting economic growth, structural adjustment programmes proved disastrous for most 
developing countries. 
In the current existing TDCA, about 95% of agricultural exports from the EU enjoy duty free-
while only about 70% of South Africa’s shipments to the EU enjoy the same duty-free market 
access.116 It is understood that the EU is demanding further market access despite South 
Africa’s significant concessions especially on geographical location. The duty-free access to 
EU imports, coupled with relatively strong rand, has led to an increase in imports to South 
Africa, which resulted to the erosion of the market share of local producers. 
There is however some positive output as the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) 
conducted a comprehensive study and found that a 5% increase in exports to the EU 
correlates with jobs increasing by 18900 in South Africa.117 This clearly indicates that South 
Africa’s economic fortunes remain closely tied with those of the EU. The critical point is to 
ensure that the dichotomy between economic growth and welfare gains is clearly defined, this 
will enable the real measure of the real output benefit for South Africa in the TDCA. 
                                                 
113 Lee MC ‘The EU-South Africa Free Trade Agreement: In whose interest?’(2002)20(1) Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies 81-106. 
114 K Mmatlou Sandrey R & Seventher D E Analysis of Trade between South Africa and the EU and the 
Preliminary Attempt to Examine the Impact of the EU-SA FTA on Trade (2005) 
115 See Cassim R & van Seventer D ‘Reform of South Africa’s Merchandise Trade since Democracy, an 
Overview’ (2006) University of the Witwatersrand: Johannesburg. 
116  See Marais J in a Business Times article dated 23September 2012. 
117See Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) Integrated Annual Report March 2012 (2013) Industrial 
Development Corporation: Johannesburg.  
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2.7 Conclusion 
 
Theoretically trade liberation is deemed to enhance efficiency, which then enable the trading 
countries to achieve welfare gains, however export subsidies as highlighted in various 
sections of this chapter tend to distort acceptable and progressive trading patterns. A country 
that exports local produce can be presented with new market opportunities, which can result 
in employment and income for its citizens. This is essentially the central theme of the WTO 
‘s aims, such as raising living standards, ensure full employment and increase incomes. 
From the literature review in this chapter it is clear that industrialised and export-oriented 
production requires access to technology, infrastructure and capital.  It is therefore 
unfortunate that most small-scale farmers do not have access to technology and capital; as a 
result they cannot afford to compete globally. Farmers in developing countries suffer from 
competition by cheap imports from subsidised producers. 
The global debate over agricultural trade subsidies remains critical but full of misconception 
and confusion.  It was highlighted that the idea of trade liberation is to liberate trade and as a 
result, market forces would be exempted from taxes and regulations that hinder them as well 
as government subsidies that distort them.118 This creates incentives for business all over the 
world to produce more to take advantage of more easily accessible foreign markets. This is 
supposed to generate economic activity, jobs and growth. 
According to the theory of comparative advantage, ideally every country should benefit from 
liberalised trade; however this is less clear in practice. When governments remove trade 
barriers to trade, they are opening their markets to foreign competitors. The risk they incur is 
that domestic producers may be driven out of business if the imports are too cheap. The 
conundrum is therefore created in the international trade dilemma. 
It is clear from the literature review that South Africa’s exports to the EU increased between 
1995 and 2005. South Africa’s imports from the EU decreased materially over the same 
period, however the SADC areas’ share of South African imports increased during the same 
period. It is important to note that gains will depend largely on the inclusion of products that 
                                                 
118  Rosset P The Multiple Functions and Benefits of Small Farm Agriculture in the Context of Global Trade 
Negotiations (2008) Institute for Food and Development Policy (Food First) Policy Brief.  
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are considered sensitive in as far as the TDCA between South Africa and EU is concerned. 
The exclusion of sensitive products is another form of protectionism. 
The developmental objectives of fair trade rules based on equitable and balanced trading 
system aimed at reducing poverty, would ensure that benefits of trade are meaningful to both 
developed and developing countries. Every nation is conscious of such developmental 
objectives that they are progressive and sustainable, however nations tend to prioritise their 
own interests with less consideration of other nations; and such approach cannot be effective 
and sustainable. 
It clear that the impact of subsidies is extremely reprehensible on the basis that such subsides 
penalizes efficient agricultural producers who do not have access to subsidies. Subsidies 
provide an incentive to over-produce and dispose surplus production on the world markets. 
The concentration of export subsidies on products such as dairy, sugar, beef, fruit, vegetables, 
rise and coarse grains that could effectively be produced by developing countries more 
effectively is damaging.119 
It is correct to say that in many countries domestic agricultural policies have been radically 
reformed especially reducing a reliance on price supports, which are in favour of direct 
payments. This has led to the steady decline of trade-distorting support in main industrial 
countries. It is however unfortunate that the very countries have found ways to adjust policy 
instruments to appear to show trade-distorting support reduction even when incentives to 
producers are maintained. 
There is a lot of conflicting empirical evidence in as far as the benefits of trade liberation and 
the TDCA between South Africa and EU is concerned. Lack of consensus suggests that 
further comprehensive research on the subject is required.  
In this chapter the following critical points were made: trade liberation on whether or not it 
has benefited South Africa and other developing countries, the multilateral approach in 
dealing with agricultural export subsidies as well as how South Africa can use its influence in 
its bilateral agreement with the European Union to drive a broader Southern African agenda 
or even the broader African agenda. 
                                                 
119 This is the position of the Cairns Group which includes: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Costa 
Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, 
Thailand and Uruguay. 
 
 
 
 
 41 
The next chapter will focus on the Agreement of Agriculture (AoA) and its key pillars        
inte alia market access, domestic support and export competition. The chapter will look at 
how the AoA is responding to distortion of trade by agricultural subsidies largely between 
developing and developed countries as well as amongst developing countries themselves.  
The quest to find lasting solutions for member states in the WTO and their commitment to 
comply with deadlines set to reduce and finally eliminate agricultural subsidies shall also be 
discussed. 
CHAPTER 3 
 Agreement on Agriculture in Relation to Agricultural Subsidies and the Threat of Non-
Tariff Measures in the Southern African Development Cooperation. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will focus mainly on the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) as it relates to 
alleviating and ultimately eliminating the adverse impact of various agricultural subsidies in 
the global trading system. Export subsidies and domestic support subsidies are two types of 
subsidies and come in various forms such as direct payments, marketing loans, conservation, 
insurance etc. The chapter will firstly cover AoA pillars, starting with market access, 
agricultural domestic support and subsequently discus export subsidies. 
South Africa’s own policy reforms as they relate to the AoA will be discussed in comparison 
with the reforms of other developed nations as well as within the Southern African 
Development Cooperation (SADC). The three pillars of the AoA: market access, domestic 
support and export competition will form a framework that will guide the discussion in this 
chapter. Special and differential treatment provisions available for developing countries and 
least developed countries will be touched upon, particularly South Africa’s interests as a 
trading partner and a progressive member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
3.2 Agreement on Agriculture 
Multilateral disciplines on trade in agricultural products are interpreted based on Article 31 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).120 The agreement on Agriculture 
                                                 
120 Articles 31(1) and 31(2) refer to the treaty as originally formed, its text, object, and purpose, and the 
supporting agreements among some or all of the par- ties that may form the context of the treaty for the purpose 
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(AoA) comprises of 21 articles and has 5five annexes. These articles regulate mainly the 
three pillars of the AoA, which are market access (article 4), domestic support (articles 3,6 
and 7) and export competition (articles 3,8-11).  
The three pillars of the AoA will be unpacked and discussed at length. This is in order to 
establish how the global trading system can be transformed into a fair and balanced system, 
as opposed to having a distorted trade system where wealthy nations are subsidising their 
agricultural output and poor nations who cannot afford it are disadvantaged. 
3.2.1 Market Access 
Market access in agricultural context relates to terms and conditions under which agricultural 
products are imported into other WTO member countries.121 The terms and conditions are 
meant to protect domestic producers, enforcement of internal health and technical regulations 
such as sanitary and environmental regulations. Tariff and non-tariff (NTBs)122 barriers are 
two types of barriers that countries normally use against importation of goods and services 
and as a result they are two main barriers to market access, this will be discussed in detail in 
the next section. 
Since the use of tariffs (sometimes called customs duties) as barriers to trade has decreased 
due to successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, NTBs seem to have substituted 
the use of tariffs. The NTBs as well as health standards or packaging requirements had to be 
converted into tariffs and this process is called ‘tariffication’. Countries that have undergone 
the tariffication process are eligible to apply for Special Safeguard mechanism (SSG), which 
is a mechanism that provides temporary protection against sudden surges or falls in world 
prices.123 It is unfortunate that most developing countries did not undergo tariffication, as 
they did not have a significant amount of NTBs and therefore cannot benefit from the SSG. 
                                                                                                                                                        
of interpretation. Article 31(3)(a) and (b) provide methods of interpreting a treaty in light of later developments, 
subsequent agreements, or practice. Article 31(3) (a) and (b) of the VCLT provide that: There shall be taken into 
account, together with the context:   (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions ;( b) any subsequent practice in the application of 
the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation. 
121 Desta GM Legal Issues in International Agricultural Trade: The evolution of the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture from its Uruguay Round Origins to its post Hong Kong Directions (2006)8. 
122 Any barriers to trade other than import or export duties. This may include export taxes, import bans, 
cumbersome documentation requirement etc. and are seen as instruments, which violates the WTO. 
123 Ament A Agricultural Trade Liberalisation and Protection: Impact of Agricultural Protection and 
Liberalisation on South Africa (2006)9. 
 
 
 
 
 43 
The Organisation for Economic and Corporation Development (OECD) makes a further 
distinction between non-tariff barriers (NTB) and non-tariff measures (NTM),124 which will 
be dealt with in the next section (Section 3.2.2). NTMs can be used in good faith to enforce 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, which are necessary for public health safety. It is 
critical to draw the line because NTMs can become a barrier to trade when implemented in 
such a manner that unnecessarily increase the cost of international trade or inhibit trade.125 
(i) Market Access Cases involving South Africa 
The European Union (EU) imposed restrictions in 2014 on citrus shipments from South 
Africa due to what the EU Commission referred to as the outbreak of ‘black spot’ plant 
disease. South Africa is the largest exporter of citrus fruit accounting for more than 25 
percent of global trade and more than half of its products go to the EU and Russia.126 
South Africa through the Citrus Growers Association (CGA) has recently suspended citrus 
exports to Spain, which is part of the EU over the very dispute of black spot. The CGA 
confirmed that South Africa complies with stringent sanitary measures to guard against the 
fungal disease (black spot) even though there is no scientific evidence that it could pose a risk 
to Europe’s orchids.127 
The local South African industry has 1600 growers who employ120 000 people and export 
about 1,5 million tons a year.128The impact of citrus export would have far reaching 
economic ramifications for South Africa. This is largely because South Africa is the world’s 
largest citrus exporter and the loss may include both permanent and seasonal employment in 
the sector and may cost the country millions in revenue losses. Since South African 
agricultural producers do not receive any direct support from government as those in the EU, 
this may further exacerbate the impact of the ban. 
South Africa’s Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU as highlighted in chapter 2 of this 
study allows 96% of EU products to enter South Africa duty-free. It was reported that the end 
                                                 
124 Policy measures that limit trade with no implied judgment on the legitimacy of he measures. 
125 Viljoen V Non –tariff barriers affecting trade in the CMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Agreement 
(2011) 2. 
126 See Caulderwood K ‘South Africa's Economy At Risk Amid European Import Restriction’ (2014) 
International Business Times available at   http://www.ibtimes.com/south-africas-economy-risk-amid-european-
import-restriction-1591277   (Accessed 16 May 2015). 
127 See Business Report, South Africa’s Financial daily of 20 March 2015. 
128 See Business Report, South Africa’s Financial daily of 20 March 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 44 
of the implementation of Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA), 881 out 
of South Africa’s 996 total agricultural tariff lines would be duty free regarding the European 
Community (EC). 129  
Since South Africa was overly ambitious in cutting its own import tariffs which fell below 
the WTO commitment as mentioned in chapter 2 of this mini thesis, South Africa’s average 
import tariffs is at 9%, much lower than the OECD members’ average of 16%. This result in 
the negative trade balance for South Africa since its own import tariffs are typically lower 
than the export tariffs its own products incur. 
Another case is where South Africa itself imposed anti-dumping duties against its fellow 
BRICS130 member, Brazil. South Africa is no stranger to imposing anti-dumping duties as it 
introduced 30 anti-dumping actions in 1996, more than any other country in the world.131 The 
overarching agreement, which is essentially the legal framework in dealing with all trade in 
goods matters, is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAATT) of 1994 under 
article VI of GAAT, which guarantees WTO members the right to impose anti-dumping 
duties.132  
The South African Poultry Association (SAPA) complained in the South Africa’s 
International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) about Brazilian poultry. SAPA 
alleged that Brazil was dumping its frozen whole and boneless chicken cuts in the Southern 
Customs Union (SACU)133 countries. ITAC conducted an investigation, which found that 
indeed three Brazilian importers sold their chicken at lower prices than those in Brazil.134 
In January 2012 South Africa applied anti-dumping duties on Brazilian poultry, however 
Brazil approached the WTO to lodge a trade dispute against South Africa. Brazil’s dispute 
with South Africa failed to proceed past the consultation phase, however South Africa did not 
proceed further with definitive anti-dumping but instead opted for import tariffs of up to 82% 
                                                 
129 Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Presentation to Portfolio Committee on Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries on tariffs and subsidies in agriculture   (2012) Department of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries; Pretoria.  
130 An association of five major emerging economies, which comprises of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa. 
131 Debroy B & Chakraborty D  Anti-dumping: Global Abuse of a Trade Policy Instrument (2007) 68ff. 
132 WTO Agreement on the implementation of Article V1 of the General Agreement and Tariffs and Trade 
(1994) WTO: Geneva at  https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/20-val.pdf (Accessed 16 May 2015). 
133 The Union includes South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Namibia. 
134 Provisional payments on chicken meat from Brazil, International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC), 
12 February 2012, http://www.itac.org.za. (Accessed 26 June 2014). 
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which apply on all imports originating from countries with no preferential trade arrangement, 
rather than Brazilian imports only.135 
(ii) Market Access between the least developed, Developing and Developed countries 
The historical context of market access is critical to enable a viable conclusion to this chapter, 
so that future policy makers and trade law scholars can be able to steer away from historical 
mistakes when formulating future trade policies. The reality is that in the 1970s when 
businesses in the United States and Europe were confronted by rising wages and excess 
productive capacity, they needed access to third world markets to move their excess 
production.136 
The developing and least developed countries at the time were confronted by debt crisis. The 
two main issues were that developed nations needed market access to developing world’s 
markets, while the developing world needed debt restructuring. Institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank introduced structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs) of which the central features were trade liberalisation, privatisation, 
slashing of import tariffs and quotas to enable market access. 
Member countries of the WTO were required by the AoA according to Article 4.2137 to 
reduce tariffs. It should however be noted that the process of tariffication and subsequent 
lowering of tariffs did not result in equitable balance for the benefit of all developing 
countries. In the Sub-Saharan Africa most developing countries rely mostly on agricultural 
products than manufactured goods for their exports revenues. The most unfortunate reality is 
that average agricultural tariffs remain higher than tariffs for non-agricultural products.138 
The major source of discontentment with the current multilateral trading regime, is that high 
tariffs were maintained on developing countries’ export products such as cotton, sugar, 
cereals and horticulture. Another factor to this was the escalation of tariffs, which protect the 
processing industries of importing countries and this creates obstacles for developing 
                                                 
135 Frazer J ‘South Africa-Brazil trade partnership hits potholes’ (2013) Inter Press Service News Agency, 12 
January 2013 at http://www.ipsnews.net. 
136 Rosset PM Agricultural Subsidies and Trade Issues: The Key Alternatives (2005)5. 
137 Developed countries were to cut their tariffs by an average of 36% over 6 years, developing countries were to 
reduce their tariffs by an average of 24% over 10 years, least developed countries are not imposed any reduction 
commitments. (See AoA, Article 15,2). 
138De Schutter O International Trade in Agriculture and the Right to Food (2009)12. 
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countries to diversify their exports especially the exports of higher value-added products.  
While developing countries struggle to find their way through to the markets of developed 
countries, developed countries had always had their way in developing countries. The US and 
the EU exports were a key underlying motivator for Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs).139 The central complaint from developing countries in contemporary trade 
negotiations is that they have already opened their markets through SAPs and now they’re 
being pushed to another round of tariff cuts.140 
The theory of comparative advantage as highlighted in chapter 2 dictates that if one country 
is good at producing one product while another country is good at producing another, trading 
partners should benefit equitably as their means of production or climatic conditions allow 
them to produce that particular product efficiently. The reality however does not however 
illustrate this, since both the US and the EU benefited from the policy of development via 
import substitution141 that developing countries cannot use to enable growth and 
development. 
This has created a belief within developing and least developing countries that the AoA 
legitimises and maintains imbalances between countries, based on their respective ability to 
support their agricultural producers. The study will elaborate further on this belief in the next 
two pillars of the AoA in order to test the veracity of such claims and look at how the 
multilateral trade regime can create a fair and equitable balance in trade benefits between 
developed, developing and least developed countries. 
 
3.2.1 The Threat of Non-Tariff Measures in the Southern African Development  
Co-operation Regional Integration. 
 
It is important to highlight that non-tariff measures are not only a hindrance to market access 
between developing and developed countries, but also among developing countries 
themselves. Southern African Development Community (SADC) has made substantial 
                                                 
139 The central feature of the Structural Adjustment Programmes was trade liberalisation, including the cutting of 
imports tariffs and quotas, steep cuts in domestic subsidies and the start of across the board privatisation of state 
services and enterprises.  
140 Rosset PM Agricultural Subsidies and Trade Issues: The Key Alternatives (2005)5. 
141 Trade and economic policy that advocates replacing foreign imports with domestic production-this is based 
on the premise that a country should attempt to reduce its foreign dependency through local production of 
industrialised products. 
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progress in encouraging regional integration by lowering tariff barriers to regional trade. 
SADC protocol launched a free trade area in August 2008, which resulted in 85%142 of intra-
SADC trade flows being duty free.143  
The main problem that has however been identified is the escalation of None-Tariff measures 
(NTMs).144 There are a number of NTMs that have been identified to be a major impediment 
of regional trade especially in the Tripartite Territory that includes COMESA (Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa), EAC (East African Community) and SADC 
(Southern African Development Community). The list includes the following NTBs:145 
 Customs Procedures and administrative requirements e.g. anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties, border tax adjustment and deposit requirements on imports. 
 Technical standards e.g. related to health such as sanitary and environmental 
regulations. 
 Government participation in trade and lack of physical infrastructure. 
If one looks at the literature on customs procedure, it indicates that Shoprite (Retail 
supermarket chain) spends approximately US$ 5.8 million per year on administrative costs to 
secure US$ 13.6 million in duty savings under SADC preferences146. Woolworths (Retail 
chain store) chooses not to use SADC preferences when exporting food products in non-
SACU (non-South African Trade Custom Union) markets, but instead to pay full price due to 
costly SADC rules147. This is a serious impediment to regional trade integration that urgently 
needs to be resolved. 
Technical barriers are still part of major impediments to trade within the SADC region. 
National standards and testing requirements, reliance on mandatory inspections and 
certifications are some of the technical barriers used in SADC. It is reported that Namibia and 
                                                 
142 SADC Secretariat, 2008 
143 The FTA is being implemented by Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  
144 Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) refer to restrictions that result from prohibitions, conditions, or specific market 
requirements that make importation or exportation of products difficult and/or costly.  
145  Viljoen W Non-Tariff barriers affecting trade in the COMESA-EAC-SADC.  
146 Gillson J Deepening Regional Trade Integration to eliminate fragmented goods market in Southern Africa. 
147 Gillson 2006. 
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Swaziland are the only 2 countries that have adopted all 78 SADC standards for the region.148   
Table 3.1: The following barriers affect trade in different agricultural products in the 
SADC region. The table highlights a list of Non Tariff Barriers (NTB) and the list of 
products affected as a result of NTBs. 
Non Tariff Barriers Products affected 
Import bans, quotas 
and levies 
Wheat, poultry, flour, meat, maize, sugar, eggs, pork and fruits & 
vegetables 
Import permits and 
levies 
Eggs, fruit & vegetables, livestock and maize 
Single marketing 
channels 
Wheat, meat, dairy, maize and sugar 
Rules of origin Palm oil and wheat flour 
Export taxes Dried beans, live animals, sugar, maize and coffee 
Standards Milk, meat, maize, bran, cotton cake, poultry, sugar, coffee and 
ostriches. 
Source: Gilson (2010) 
Application of harmonised standards in the SADC regime is critical to encourage intra-
regional trade. Participation of national governments, which includes parastatals in trade in 
the operation of ports and borders can also be used to protect domestic industries and the 
trade of specific monopolistic goods. 
 
 
 
                                                 
148 Viljoen W Non-tariff barriers affecting trade in the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Agreement. 
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3.2.2 Mechanism for Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers in the Southern African 
Development Co-operation 
 
SADC Protocol through Article 6 requires all member countries to adopt and implement 
policies that will eliminate current NTBs. This is also the case with regards to the legal 
instruments of the Tripartite Territory that includes COMESA (Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa), EAC (East African Community) and SADC (Southern African 
Development Community). Article 14 of the 2010 Draft Tripartite Agreement provide for a 
common and coordinated mechanism to eliminate NTBs. 
In the SADC region in particular, NTBs complaints are channelled through to the SADC 
Secretariat, however if the resolution is not found the case is then forwarded to the SADC 
Task Team specifically dealing with NTBs. If the complaint is not resolved at that level it is 
then referred to the SADC Dispute Settlement Mechanism.149 SADC’s legal position on 
NTBs is clear, in that it requires member states to implement measures to eliminate all 
existing NTBs since they can be obstacles to free movement of goods. 
Other mechanisms include the following key pragmatic resolutions: 
 Establishment of National Monitoring Committees (NMCs) and capacity 
building Programme for the NMCs.  
 Introduction of the Proposed Mobile-to-Email Feature of the NTBs 
Reporting, Elimination and Monitoring System. 
 Adoption and Implementation of Electronic SADC Certificate of Origin. 
 Adoption of the use of Harmonised System 2012 by all SADC member states. 
 Adoption of the revised Kyoto Convention150 to simplify and harmonise 
Custom Procedures in SADC. 
                                                 
149 Viljoen W Non-tariff barriers affecting trade in the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Trade Alliance. 
150  The International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonisation of Customs procedures entered into 
force in 1974. The World Customs Organisation (WCO) adopted the revised Kyoto Convention in June 1999 as 
a blueprint for modern and efficient Customs procedures in the 21st century. 
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3.2.4 Agricultural Domestic Support (The Colloquial Boxes) 
 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture encapsulated agreements to discipline some 
domestic as well as trade policies.151 The attempt to accomplish agreement on agriculture 
requires countries to control and gradually reduce support levels on policies that support 
agricultural subsidies.  
 
The graphic illustration below shows the structure of the agreement on Agriculture 
Figure 3: Structure of the Agreement on Agriculture 
 
Source: WTO E-Learning November 2010 
The final agreement resolved that domestic policies that are deemed to have the largest 
impact on production and trade (Referred to as Amber box policies) are to be disciplined. 
This is where each member country is required to gradually reduce its support level. Policies 
that were viewed as having the least impact, which does not amount to the minimal  
trade-distorting effects on production and trade (Referred to as Green box policies) are to be 
exempted from being disciplined. 
                                                 
151 Trade policies, refer to the set of policies designed specifically to affect trade flows and prices through use of 
import quotas, tariffs, and export subsidies. Domestic policies include all other agricultural policies within a 
country that aim to influence internal farm and rural incomes, resource use, production, consumption of 
agricultural products, or environ- mental impacts of farming. 
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Measures that are permitted are classified under three broad categories:152  
 There are those measures available to all WTO members, 
(I) These include that all members are free to use the so-called “green box” 
measures under Annex 2 of the AoA. 
(II) All members are free to provide de minimis153 levels of non-green support. 
(5% for developed countries and 10% for developing countries of the total 
value of production of basic agricultural product in the case of product-
specific support. 
 The pursuit of differential treatment, which comprises three forms of support, are 
available exclusively to developing country members, these include, 
(I)  Investment subsidies that are generally available to agriculture. 
(II) Agricultural input subsidies that are generally available to low-income 
producers. 
(III) Measures of producer support to encourage diversification from growing illicit 
narcotics crops. 
 Those measures available exclusively to developed and high-income developing 
countries such as. 
(I) Direct payments provided under production-limiting programmes (‘blue box 
measures’).  
(II) The residual category of all other forms of support that are not covered by any 
of the exemptions (generally referred to as ‘amber box’ measures). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
152 Desta GM Legal Issues in International Agricultural Trade: The evolution of the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture from its Uruguay Round Origins to its post Hong Kong Directions (2006) FAO Legal Papers 
Online. 
153 De Minis Clause of the AoA allows countries to maintain a certain level of support (aggregate measure of 
support/ AMS). In the Amber Box support is divided into two categories, commodity specific and non- 
commodity support. 
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Table 3.2: Domestic Support Structure 
Exemption from Reduction Commitments 
(1) Green Box Annex 2 No more than minimally trade or 
production distorting 
(2) Blue Box Article 6.5 Product-limiting Programs 
(3) Development Programmes Article 6.2 Investment, Input, Diversification 
Reduction Commitments & de minis allowance 
(4) Amber Box Article 3& 6 Reduction Commitments, de minis 
Article 7 General Disciplines 
Annex 3 Aggregate Measurement of Support 
Annex 4 Equivalent Measurement of Support 
Source:  WTO E-Learning, November 2010 
 
There are other alternatives that have been put forward by most developing nations such as 
the complete elimination of export dumping within the provisions of the AoA.  
Developing countries seem to agree that market access will be almost meaningless if the 
export dumping is not completely addressed.  
Another alternative is the removal of agricultural issues from the WTO because most 
developing countries believe that pushing for more market access as an export model 
destroys self-sufficiency and expertise of traditional farming methods. 
(1). Green Box Measures 
 
These measures are regarded as theoretically safe and do not have major effects on trade 
flows and patterns. That is why such measures are permitted to have unlimited amounts of 
supports and payments. Under the green box measures support can be for environmentally 
sound practices, pest and crop disease management, infrastructure, food storage against 
famine, income insurance, emergency programs and the so-called ‘decoupled payments’, 
these are direct payments to farmers that support their incomes.154 
 This essentially means that member countries may give unlimited amount of direct income 
support to the farmers as long as the payments are made in a decoupled manner from 
production and trade decisions. It is also important to note that member countries can also 
                                                 
154 See Rosset PM Agricultural Subsidies and Trade Issues: The Key Alternatives (2005) Global Policy 
Innovations Project:  New York.  
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provide income insurance and disaster relief services as long as farmers do not make profit 
from such occurrences.  
One way to establish if the subsidy is not distorting trade, it is when it is used in a manner 
that is not adversely affecting other member countries and that no action is brought against 
the user. The distortion of the agricultural markets in the developed world which 
compromises African agricultural advantage, should not rift an African position that it remain 
the duty of the distorters to ease the cost of transition in terms of compensation.155  
One major concern with green box subsidies is whether or not payments made under this 
category meet compliance requirements described in paragraph 1 of Annex 2 of the AoA156. 
There has been general speculation that since there is no ceiling on the amount of green box 
subsidies that government can provide, some governments are shifting their subsidy spending 
into green box category. 
Developing countries have been calling for the tightening of rules around the use of 
contagious items, such as direct payments, decoupled payments and income support. The 
African position on agriculture has been that of a reformist stance which is informed by 
development of sustainable agricultural production to curb the threat of food security.  The 
sustainability of both agriculture and the broader natural environment should now take 
centre- stage as opposed to the individual interest that dictates that the winner takes it all even 
if that means marginalising other nations.                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
155 Zunkel H & Njinkeu D ‘The Future of ‘The Boxes’ under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture – Suggestions 
from an African Perspective’ (2004) ILEAP Background Brief No 2 at 
http://www.ileapjeicp.org/downloads/bb02_the_future_of_the_boxes_under_the_wto_agreement_on_agricultur
e_apr_04.pdf  (Accessed 16 May 2015). 
156 All must comply with the “fundamental requirement” in paragraph 1, to cause not more than minimal 
distortion of trade and production, and must be provided through a government-funded programme. 
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Table 3.4: Green Box 
 
Source: WTO Members' notifiations. Conversion to US$ prepared for training purposes only, 
using exchange rates from the "International Financial Statistics" of the IMF. Figures have 
been rounded to the nearest million. For actual figures and currencies, please consult the 
notifications. 
Please note that China became a WTO Member on 11 December 2001. The domestic support 
notification (G/AG/N/CHN/8) concerning the years 1999-2001 was provided by China for 
transparency purposes. 
(2). Blue Box Measures 
 
These measures refer to programs that direct payments to farmers for programs to limit 
production.157 It is critical to note that countries with programs that limit production can fund 
them with unlimited levels of support. Seven WTO members, European Union (EU), United 
States of America (US), Norway, Iceland, Japan, Slovenia and Slovakia, have used these 
measures.158 
After World War II policy makers adopted Keynesian principles159 to ensure economic 
stability and social welfare by ensuring that governments regulate markets. State regulated 
                                                 
157See Rosset PM Agricultural Subsidies and Trade Issues: The Key Alternatives (2005) Global Policy 
Innovations Project:  New York.  
158 Zunkel H & Njinkeu D ‘The Future of ‘The Boxes’ under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture – Suggestions 
from an African Perspective’ (2004) ILEAP Background Brief No 2 at 
http://www.ileapjeicp.org/downloads/bb02_the_future_of_the_boxes_under_the_wto_agreement_on_agricultur
e_apr_04.pdf  (Accessed 16 May 2015). 
159 Economists of the time – led by John Maynard Keynes – suggested that the state should get involved in 
regulating capitalism.   They argued that by lowering unemployment, raising wages, and increasing consumer 
demand for goods, the state could guarantee continued economic growth and social well-being. 
                                                  Green Box (US$ million) 
Selected 
Members  
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Brazil 4,883 2,600 3,458 2,420 1,568 1,487 1,462 
China*     22,267 25,113 29,278 
European 
Union (15) 
24,272 26,834 19,983 21,467 21,971 19,464 18,469 
South Africa 762 525 544 451 423 393 351 
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markets delivered sustainable growth until the United States of America (USA) and Europe 
found themselves with excess productive capacity and rising wages in the 1970s, they were 
literally producing more than their home markets could absorb.160 This was the main reason 
why these countries had to find access to the third world markets to move access production. 
It has been noted that blue box measures are potentially open to abuse as countries have 
attempted to disguise other forms of subsidies as blue box measures. It is therefore for that 
reason why many trade law experts and advisors are calling for the blue box support 
measures to be included in the calculation of the current total AMS (Agreement Measure of 
Support). This will ensure that they are capped and then limited in the same manner as the 
amber box. 
The US and EU both suggested the total value of blue box support to be capped at five 
percent of total value of national agricultural production in each member country. The 
proposal from the Group of 20 countries (G20) on the other hand, called for the elimination 
of blue box support altogether, and the G20 proposal is shared by the Africa group that the 
reduction in blue box should move from reduction to elimination.  
Since the EU and Japan insists on retaining the blue box, the solution that is likely to emerge 
is that of compromise, in that the blue box will be included in the main AMS discipline. That 
would then limit the blue box in the same manner as the amber box. 
(3). Development Box 
Development box is found in article 6(2) of the AoA and it relates to exemptions granted to 
developing countries. The provision exempts 3 types of subsidies from reduction 
commitments. These include investment subsidies, input subsidies and payment to diversify 
from drug production. 
The clause is a critical part of the agricultural package for African countries as the separation 
of development box from the general Amber Box provisions makes it clearer that these 
provisions are not for the use of developed countries, but mainly developing countries. 
African countries need to call for the continuation and strengthening of the provision with an 
expansion of the provision into a wider Development Box. 
                                                 
160 See Rosset PM Agricultural Subsidies and Trade Issues: The Key Alternatives (2005) Global Policy 
Innovations Project:  New York. 
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(4). Amber Box Measures 
 
These measures or support programs are considered the most trade distorting and are subject 
to reduction commitments. Agreement Measurement of Support (AMS)161reduction is the 
commitment that has been given by 35 WTO member countries162 who have reported to have 
used such trade distorting measures. Member states from the developed world undertook the 
reduction of 20% commitment over a six-year period while developing countries undertook 
13.3% reduction commitment over a ten-year period. 
The 35 member states that have given an undertaking to reduce trade-distorting measures, are 
the only ones allowed to provide amber box support within the limits of their commitments. 
The WTO member states that have not undertaken such commitments, particularly the 
poorest developing countries are prohibited from providing-amber box support measures to 
their farmers or producers. They basically rely on special and differential treatment and de 
minis levels of support. 
The main debate around amber box support measures is whether to reduce such support over 
a period of time or to completely eliminate it altogether. Since the list of 35 countries allowed 
to use amber box measures features only two African countries (South Africa and Morocco), 
The Africa group proposed substantial reduction and also went further to seek complete 
elimination of amber box support measures. 
3.2.5 Export Competition 
 
The proliferation of export subsidies was one of the key issues during the period that led to 
the Uruguay Round. Subsidies have been discussed at length in this study in that they 
increase competition for other exporters or for domestic producers in other importing 
countries. Exporters who are endowed with export subsidies have the advantage to sell below 
the cost of production.  Advanced industrial economies still maintain tariffs that are four 
                                                 
161 AMS defined in Article 1(a) of the AoA as the annual level of support, expressed in monetary terms, 
provided for an agricultural product or non-product specific support provided in favour of agricultural producers 
in general. 
162 These are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, EC, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Lithuania, Mexico, Moldova, 
Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, 
Switzerland- Liechtenstein, Thailand, Tunisia, United States, and Venezuela. 
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times higher against poor countries than the tariffs they have against other rich countries.163 
Export subsidies affect world price variations, in that the level of subsidy in most cases 
depends on the difference between domestic and world prices. This therefore means that if 
the global market price fall the subsidy increases but the supply from the subsidised country 
can remains the same or even increases.164Since subsidies mostly depend on the difference 
between the world prices and domestic prices, the exporter can therefore be able to match or 
undercut other countries’ exporters who are unsubsidised. 
The right to use export subsidies is limited in two situations, namely: 
 Export subsidies subject to product-specific reduction commitments within the limits 
specified in the Schedule of the WTO Member concerned; and 
 Export subsidies consistent with the special and differential treatment provision for 
developing country members (Article 9.4 of the AoA).165 
(1). Article 9 (Subsidies to be reduced) 
 
Article 9 comprises of export subsidies that are subject to reduction. WTO members may not 
provide export subsidies in respect of the agricultural products in excess of the commitments 
as stated in Article 3.3 of the AoA. 
Article 9 covers the following: 
 The provision by governments or their agencies of direct subsidies, including 
payments-in-kind, to a firm, to an industry, to producers of an agricultural product, to 
a cooperative or other association of such producers, or to a marketing board, 
contingent on export performance;  
 Sales of non-commercial stocks of agricultural products for export at prices lower 
than comparable prices for such goods on the domestic market;  
 Payments on the export of an agricultural product that are financed by virtue of 
governmental action, which is taken to include producer financed subsidies, such as, 
                                                 
163 Stieglitz J Making Globalisation Work-The 2006 Geary Lecture (2008)39 (3)  Economic and Social Review 
171–190 
164 Zunckel H Agriculture and the WTO. 
165 See WTO E-Learning: Agriculture in the WTO. 
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government programmes which require a levy on all production which is then used to 
subsidies the export of a certain portion of that production;  
 Cost reduction measures such as subsidies to reduce the cost of marketing goods for 
export: this can include upgrading and handling costs and the costs of international 
freight;  
 Internal transport subsidies applying to exports only, such as those designed to bring 
exportable produce to one central point for shipping; and  
 Subsidies on incorporated products, i.e. subsidies on agricultural products.  
(2). Exception in Article 9.4 
 
This exception is one of the special and differential treatment provisions of the AoA and was 
only available during the implementation period. Article 9.4 allowed developing countries to 
use subsidies aimed at reducing the cost of marketing including internal and external 
transport as well as handling and processing costs (that is the subsidies listed in Article 9.1(d) 
and (e)), provided that these are not applied in a manner that would circumvent export 
subsidy reduction commitments. 
It is critical to note that subsidies can be used only for products on which members have 
commitments and that members that can subsidize exports cannot:166 
 Introduce new subsidies for products that are not listed on the Schedules; 
 Exceed the limits in their schedules; or 
 Transfer existing commitments to other agricultural products. 
 The catch on the other side of the provisions of special and differential treatment was 
that they were not mandatory but instead dependent on the political will of developed 
countries. This played a role in challenges regarding implementation of such 
provisions; hence developing countries have always maintained that they should be 
mandatory and binding on countries with fully developed economies. 
                                                 
166 See World Trade Organization European Community-Export Subsidies on Sugar:  AB-2005-2 /Report of the 
Appellate Body (2005) World Trade Organization - WT/DS266/21. 
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The main arguments that have been advanced in the WTO for special and differential 
treatment are:167 
 Developing countries should enjoy privileged access to the markets of their trading 
partners, particularly developed countries. 
 Developing countries should have the right to restrict imports to a greater degree than 
developed countries. 
 Developing countries should be allowed additional freedom to subsidize exports. 
 Developing countries should be allowed flexibility on the application of certain rules. 
 
Table 3.5: The main provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture on export 
competition  
AoA Provisions  
 
                                     Countries 
Developing Least Developed Developed 
Base Period 1995-2004 1986-1990 1986-1990 
Implementation Period 1995-2004 1995-2004 1995-2000 
Proportionate reductions in: 
Value of expenditure on 
subsidies 
24% 0% 36% 
Quantity of subsidized 
exports 
14% 0% 21% 
Exemptions  Marketing costs of exported products 
 Internal transport and freight charge 
None 
                                                 
167 See Keck A & Low P ‘Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO:  Why, When and How?’(2004) WTO 
Economic Research and Statistics Division - Staff Working Paper ERSD-2004-03 available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd200403_e.doc  (Accessed 16 May 2015). 
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Source: Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
The provisions should be premised upon ensuring that developing countries are given 
opportunities to grow their economies to competitive levels in order to try and level the 
playing field in the global trade. The central guideline for the WTO should be to guide the 
global trading community into global partnership and not global domination of one nation by 
another. It is for that reason why developing countries should continue to enjoy special and 
differential treatment with proposals listed above if WTO is to achieve a global stable trading 
environment. 
3.4 Conclusion 
It becomes imperative to conclude by once again looking retrospectively to whether or not 
the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) has accomplished a fair global trade environment. This 
will reveal whether the WTO in general has been effective relative to its GATT- predecessor 
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). The mandate of the AoA remains the elimination 
of distortive agricultural practices. This emanated from the fact that wealthy nations such as 
the US and the EU had insisted on exemptions to allow them to provide massive subsidies to 
their agricultural sectors. This led to the sale of agricultural surpluses on the world market at 
prices below the cost of production and such practice is called dumping. 
Developing countries have been encouraged to reduce or even abolish barriers to trade to 
allow global trade to flow unrestricted. The call for the elimination of export subsidies is not 
convincingly as aggressive as the call to eliminate barriers to trade, there should be 
correlation between the two proposals. There seem to be less focus on the WTO objective of 
improving human development and living standards and more focus is placed on the quest for 
trade liberalization. This has led to developing countries accusing the institution of driving 
the agenda of transnational commodity traders and processors, such as Cargill and Monsanto 
and compromising small-scale farmers. 
This was evident in the occurrences, which led to the collapse of the third Ministerial 
Conference in Seattle. While it is well understood that the developed countries’ market 
distortions caused by agricultural subsidies are denying developing countries and mainly 
African countries’ rightful place in agricultural global trade, it is also a truism that cannot be 
disputed that wealthy countries will always have resources to provide support via subsidies. 
 
 
 
 
 61 
The question is how do both developed and developing nations ensure that those subsidies 
that are currently tolerated through the so-called ‘box’ regimes are not displacing Africa’s 
comparative agricultural advantage in global trade? 
South Africa as the largest African exporter of processed food had only 1% of the global 
market share between the periods of 2000-2005.168Sub-Saharan Africa is largely dependent 
on traditional non-fuel primary commodities such as coffee, cocoa, tobacco, tea and sugar 
and had struggled to develop into an exporter of processed foods. This is largely because of 
the presence of highly subsidised foodstuff in the international markets produced in 
industrialized countries and the highly penalizing structure of tariffs (Tariff peaks and tariff 
escalation) in OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries.  
These realities have forced African countries that were net food-exporting countries to 
becoming mostly net-food importing countries. This should therefore be a justification for 
African countries to be given a platform by the WTO to invest in Agriculture in order to 
attain its rightful position in the global trading environment. The implementation of the WTO 
agreements should strike a balance pertaining to the gains created by such agreements that the 
developing countries should enjoy for compromising too much on trade liberalization on their 
economies. 
Global financial institutions prescribed that the developing countries should open up their 
economies to allow imports in and export more of their commodities. If a country spends 
money on manufacturing products within its boarders, the money that flows to pay for 
materials, labour and other costs moves within the economy and contributes to the Gross 
National Product (GNP) of that particular country. If money is spent in another country 
circulation of that money is within the exporting country, hence South Africa shed a lot of 
jobs in the manufacturing, particularly clothing and textile sector due to trade liberalisation. 
Developed nations grow rich by selling capital-intensive products, thus cheap products for a 
high price and buying labour-intensive, thus expensive products for a low price. This is the 
main reason why an industrialized product-exporting/commodity-importing country is 
wealthy and undeveloped product-importing/commodity-exporting country is poor.169This 
                                                 
168 See OECD Business for Development 2008 - Promoting Commercial Agriculture in Africa (2008) OECD: 
Paris. 
169 See Smith JW The World’s Wasted Wealth 2(1994) Institute for Economic Democracy: Cambria.  
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analogy applies to capital-intensive agricultural subsidies by wealthy nations versus labour 
intensive produced agricultural products from developing countries. 
The WTO and its member states should seek to destroy the notion that maintains ‘the 
dominant over the dominated’ as this is still regarded as the status quo in most global 
organizational structures. The perceived aim of driving the neo-liberal economic 
globalisation, which seems to impose heavy costs in particularly developing countries, has 
made the developing world critical of WTO‘s credibility to ensure fair trade between member 
states. Since developing countries are now aware of the injustices in substance and the abuses 
of power in practice they are calling for a ‘review, repair and reform’ of the WTO.  
This is a fair call for a multilateral trading institution that claims to be based on principle, 
fairness, transparency and equal opportunities on the basis of economic law of comparative 
advantage. Agriculture is the issue of principle and if indeed the WTO ‘s aims are also based 
on the principle of fairness then African countries and other developing countries 
participation should not be disenfranchised simply because they cannot wield a veto.  
The day-to-day activities of the WTO should reflect the consensus-based decision making 
process both in theory and in practice.  This chapter encapsulated the AoA and its three 
pillars, market access, domestic support and export subsidies. The next chapter will cover the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and South Africa’s involvement in the DSU. This 
will help establish whether South Africa and other developing countries are utilising the 
instruments provided for in the WTO to protect and advance its developmental interests. 
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CHAPTER 4 
South Africa’s vision for Agricultural Development through the National Development 
Plan and the New Growth Path and Global Challenges of World Trade Law. 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will focus on South Africa’s vision for the future of agricultural development 
and how the country’s agricultural output can thrive in the light of global competition and 
agricultural subsidies. The chapter will look at two critical documents that have 
comprehensively provided a review of where South Africa is currently in terms of 
development, and where it seeks to be by the year 2030. 
The National Development Plan (NDP)170 for 2030 and the New Growth Path171 are two 
developmental strategies that the country has adopted that cover the broad spectrum of 
developmental initiatives. This chapter will focus only on agricultural initiatives that will 
drive the country’s agricultural agenda within the acceptable World Trade Organisation’s 
(WTO) clauses and its position on agricultural subsidies.  These initiatives are aimed at 
spearheading agricultural development, rural development as well as the provision of much 
needed jobs in the agricultural sector in South Africa. 
 
4.2 National Development Plan and Agricultural Development 
 South African government has been supporting farmers with debt consolidation subsidies of 
R344 million, crop production loans of R470 million, drought relief of R120 million and also 
acted as a guarantor of consolidated debt of R900 million in the eighties and early nineties.172  
The government eliminated support to commercial farmers when it embarked on its trade 
liberation policies after the democratically elected government came into power in 1994.  
                                                 
170 The National Development Plan -2030 was adopted in 2013 as South Africa’s long-term socio-economic 
development map. This policy is viewed as a blueprint for eliminating poverty and reducing inequality by 2030. 
171 The New Growth Path is the economic policy and development adopted by South African government in 
2010 to envision and accelerate growth in the economy in ways that rapidly reduce poverty, unemployment and 
inequality. 
172 Kirsten J & Vink N Policy Module South Africa. Presented under the Roles of Agriculture Project at the 
International Conference on the 20-22 October 2003 Rome, Italy. Agricultural and Development Economics 
Division, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.  
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Since then a number of policies have been adopted, from the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP)173, Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR)174, 
Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGI-SA)175 and later the New 
Growth Path. The New Growth Path was adopted in the year 2010 and runs concurrently with 
the NDP, which will be discussed in this section. 
 The vision for the integration of South Africa’s rural areas enshrined in the National NDP for 
2030 includes the development of small enterprises such agro-processing, fisheries (in coastal 
areas) and other agricultural economic opportunities. The NDP proposes agriculture as a 
primary economic activity in rural areas and recommends the following interventions:176 
 
 Expand irrigated agriculture. Evidence shows that the 1.5 million hectares under 
irrigation can be expanded by at least 500 000 hectares through better use of existing 
water resources and developing water schemes. 
 Convert some under-used land in communal areas and land reform projects into 
commercial production. 
 Pick and support commercial agricultural sectors and regions that have the highest 
potential for growth and employment. 
 Support job creation in the upstream and downstream industries. 
 Develop strategies that give new entrants access to product value-chains and support 
from better-resourced players. 
The government acknowledges that in order to achieve sustainable positive outcomes for the 
above interventions, attention must be given to bureaucratic systems that will ensure that all 
farmers can access domestic and foreign markets. Major global public constituencies such as 
family farm and consumer groups, environmentalists, and food and agricultural unions also 
share this idea. The threat to the success of such progressive proposals rests largely with 
                                                 
173 The development programme that was initiated by the Congress of South African Trade Unions and 
ultimately developed by the African National Congress Alliance as an integrated socio-economic framework. 
174 The government economic development policy that was adopted in 1996, focusing on neo-liberal approach to 
promote economic climate that was more investor-friendly. 
175 The economic and development initiative that was launched in 2006 with among other goals to promote 
growth rate of 4.5% for 2005 to 2009 and 6% for the period of 2010 to 2014. 
176 National Planning Commission National Development Plan 2030: Our future - make it work (2012) 197.  
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agricultural subsidies supported and defended by some governments and the food and 
agricultural industries, which stand to benefit in the current status quo. 
Article 25 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights177 recognizes the right to adequate 
food as well as on Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights178. These regulatory instruments are meant to ensure that all States have the policy 
space they require to ensure the realization of the right to food in their respective 
jurisdictions. The NDP needs to be given that policy space to address the plight of 
development in South Africa. 
The majority of poor people in the world are located in developing countries; they live in 
rural areas and depend on agriculture directly or indirectly for their livelihoods179. People in 
rural communities are poor and their incomes are on average lower relative to those in urban 
areas. They are net buyers of food; however they cannot afford to buy food other than the 
food they produce themselves. 
The question is whether the WTO framework was built (progressively lowering the barriers 
to trade whether in the form of tariffs or non-tariff barriers) to contributes to the objectives of 
eliminating food insecurity. Such objectives comprise producing food in a manner that 
preserves the environment for sustainability and such production must raise incomes of 
small-scale farmers and agricultural labourers in developing countries. 
Uruguay Round of trade discussions concluded in 1994, brought about prospects of equitable 
share of the world trade benefits. The prospects were replaced by disillusionment, which was 
clearly evident by 1999 during the Seattle protests. In order to determine justice in the global 
trading rules, South Africa should review the benefits of trade liberalisation relative to 
development in the country. The extent to which the developed world has opened its markets 
for South Africa’s agricultural products should also be used as a barometer to measure policy 
success and challenges as well as to determine future trade policy.  
                                                 
177 See the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948.  
178 See the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966.. The right to adequate food is also referred 
to in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 24 (2) (c)), and in the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Article 12 (2)).  
179 See The World Bank World Development Report 2008 - Agriculture for Development (2007) The World 
Bank: Washington DC. 
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South Africa within the NDP framework should also look at strengthening the capacity of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) legal scholarship within itself in order to increase skills 
base, should the need arise to participate in trade dispute settlements. Non-participation has 
disadvantaged African states as Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) affords developing 
countries the opportunities to defend their trade interests against encroachment by powerful 
countries. The case of United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton180 is a classic example that 
developing countries can take such bold moves and succeed. 
When Brazil initiated a case against the United States (US) arguing that the US was 
inconsistent with its obligations under Articles III: 4, XVI: 1 and XVI: 3 of the GATT 1994. 
The panel ruled in favour of Brazil as it was established that the US subsidies deflated cotton 
prices unfairly. Another case is that of European Community-Export Subsidies on Sugar181 
brought by Australia, Brazil and Thailand against the European Union (EU) for providing 
exports subsidies to its sugar industry. The panel established that the EU was dumping more 
than three times the level of subsidised sugar export182 and was therefore in violation.  
The lesson that South Africa can learn from these two cases, is that while waiting for the 
reduction of subsidies through the WTO negotiation processes, developing countries can also 
make use of existing provisions to challenge agricultural policies of other countries. The 
DSM is a platform to correct trade imbalances and to interpret the WTO law where there are 
ambiguities. South Africa needs to step up in order to shape the evolution of legal principles 
that would change the complexity of the issues that affect not only South Africa but as well 
as other developing countries in the continent.  
4.3 Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 
 
World Trade Organization is a much more comprehensive structure relative to General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and it comprises of more sophisticated elements 
beyond just goods. The organization now embraces services, intellectual property, 
                                                 
180 See World Trade Organization United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton:  AB-2004-5/Report of the 
Appellate Body (2005) World Trade Organization -WT/DS267/AB/R. 
 
181 See World Trade Organization European Community-Export Subsidies on Sugar:  AB-2005-2 /Report of the 
Appellate Body (2005) World Trade Organization - WT/DS266/21. 
182 As part of the ACP Group, the following African countries participated as third parties: Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland, and Tanzania). 
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procurement, investment and agriculture.183 The complexity of the contemporary trade 
agreements means that new trade regime is no longer a collection of ad hoc agreements. 
Trade obligations mean that member states have to accept the WTO agreements as binding. 
 
Panels and Appellate Body that directly adjudicate trade disputes between parties in the WTO 
has to conform to Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Articles 31 and 32 of 
the VCLT constitute customary international law in the interpretation of treaties. Essentially 
the WTO agreements constitute a comprehensive legal system that governs international 
trade. It is therefore critical to note that the WTO DSU does not operate in isolation. 
 
It is naturally acceptable for parties to disagree on matters of trade and that may lead to 
disputes. The WTO established a dispute settlement body comprising of dispute Panels and 
an Appellate body184, which serves as an adjudicator of trade disputes between parties. The 
role of legal adjudication has expanded since the advent of WTO dispute resolution system. 
This is indicative of a shift from power-orientated approach to a more rule-orientated.185 
Many economists and trade policy specialists view this as a way to judiciaries the process of 
dispute settlement. 
 
The dispute process in the WTO comprises of three stages: consultation, formal litigation and 
if necessary implementation. If one member state brings the case to the WTO as a 
complainant against another member state that can be referred to as a defendant, the two sides 
are given 60 days to consult with a view of finding a mutual solution that is acceptable to 
both parties.   
The 60-day consultation provides a platform for parties to negotiate and a substantial number 
of cases have ended during consultation process without going further to formal litigation.186 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
183 Cameron J & Gray K Principles of International Law in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (2001) p1. 
184 Annex 2 to the WTO Agreement (1994) 331.L.M 1226 (hereinafter DSU). 
185 Jackson JH The world trading system  (MIT Press: Press Boston,, 1989) 
186 Article 3.7 of the DSU clarifies the aim of the WTO dispute settlement system, which is to secure a mutually 
acceptable solution to the parties in disagreement resulting from consultation rather than from the adjudication 
by the panel. 
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Summary of time periods within the dispute settlement mechanism 
Time scale                                Actions 
60 days 
 
Consultations, mediation, etc. 
 
45 days 
 
Establishment of panel and appointment of members 
 
6 months 
 
Panel presents its final report to parties 
 
3 weeks 
 
Panel presents its final report to WTO Members 
 
60 days 
 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSU) adopts report (in the absence of 
appeal) 
Total = 1 year If no appeal 
60 to 90 days Appellate review report 
30 days DSB adopts the Appellate review 
Total = 1 year and 
3 months 
If a party appeals 
Source: understanding the WTO: settling dispute 
(http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm). 
 
 
This chapter will discuss three aspects of dispute settlement in international trade, namely the 
interpretation of WTO agreements, South Africa’s involvement in the WTO dispute 
settlement system relative to other developing countries, and general principles of law, 
mostly international law as it applies to all member states. The effects of change in the 
jurisprudence of global economy as well as improvement in the handling of disputes more 
efficient and expeditiously shall also be discussed. 
 
4.4 Interpretation of the WTO/DSU Articles 
 
Article 3:2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) states that WTO agreements  
are to be interpreted in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public 
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international law.187The Vienna Convention on Laws of Treaties under Article 31(1), which 
is essentially the fundamental rule of treaty interpretation states that the treaty is to be 
interpreted in good faith and in accordance with ordinary meaning given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and as well as in the light of the treaty’s object and purpose.188 
 
The fundamental principle in the interpretation of WTO rules is that such rules need to be 
reliable, comprehensible and enforceable. The ever -changing flow of facts in real cases of 
the real world also means that interpretation needs to be less rigid and be more flexible. The 
rigidity of the WTO political process itself, which is modified through treaty amendment, 
presents a fundamental rationale for governments to participate in the WTO dispute. This 
essentially enables participating countries to position themselves to effectively shape the 
WTO’s interpretation and application of law to their advantage over time.  
 
The legal adjudication process in the DSU entails looking at the text of the provision and 
subsequently determines the purpose of the treaty. The most disturbing issue though is that 
developing countries, other than the largest ones such as Brazil and India, are less likely to 
actively participate in WTO litigation due to low volume of trade with export base often 
characterized by single unprocessed commodities. The dispute system is viewed by many 
developing countries as complicated and expensive. 
 
The shortcomings of the DSU have however become clear. These include some conflicting 
deadlines (better known as sequencing), a weak enforcement mechanism, questionable 
quality of some of its rulings, and the possibility of prolonging disputes as well as the 
absence of developing countries is indicative that something enabling is amiss.189Another 
major concern for developing countries is that the DSU (and the WTO) has become too 
technically complex and demanding for most developing countries to use effectively in the 
                                                 
187 This interpretative requirement extend beyond GATT 1994 and includes other agreements such as TRIPS 
(India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products WT/DS50/AB/R, 
Dec.1997)(herein referred as TRIPS) and the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (United States-Restrictions 
on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear (Adopted on 25 Feb.1997, WT/DS24.R) (hereinafter 
referred to as Underwear) 
188 (1969),8 I.L.M.679 (hereinafter VCLT) 
189 Alavi A. Statistics on Development Policy Review, 2007 p 27 show that, until December 2005, developing 
countries initiated 39%  (132 cases) of tota             
developing country. No SSA country has yet initiated a case. South Africa and Egypt have been involved in two 
and four cases respectively as defending parties. Benin, Chad, Nigeria and Zimbabwe in one dispute each, 
Senegal in two, Tanzania and Malawi in three, and Mauritius in five disputes, have participated as third parties.  
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absence of adequate assistance. 
It is however important to note that the post -2015 discussion on the development agenda 
seeks to lay a platform for global consultation and the advancement of institutional reform 
proposals. The aim for this ultimately is to achieve a more balanced and equitable global 
trade governance.190 
If WTO agreements are to be interpreted according to the customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law, it therefore becomes necessary to understand the WTO as a part of 
the wider corpus of public international law. International law has no central legislator 
creating its rules, the states as the main subjects of international law are the creators of law, 
meaning states are equal before international law since each states’ laws have the same legal 
value. This essentially means that both developing and developed countries irrespective of 
economic value should be equal in the interpretation of articles. 
The interpretation of WTO articles should at all times be in line with international law. This 
is largely because the WTO rules are aimed at liberalising trade. Trade liberation practices 
may sometimes compromise respect for the environment and human rights. The Appellate 
Body also acknowledged that Article 3.2 of the DSU reflects a measure of recognition that 
the General Agreement (GATT) is not to be read in isolation from public international 
law.191Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention explicitly confirmed the thesis that advance 
the interpretation of treaties within the parameters of international law.  
 
4.5 South Africa and the Trade Dispute Resolution 
 
South Africa participated for the first time in DSU as a third party in 2007 in a dispute on 
agricultural subsidies. The main complainants in the dispute were Brazil and Canada against 
the US, however the main complainants later suspended the case. South Africa has never 
brought any dispute on its own before the WTO’s DSU. 
 
Due to the lack of participation by mostly developing countries, the WTO established the 
                                                 
190 Wood A Beyond 2015: Trade Reform and the Development Deficit 
191 United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R, at 17 
(Mar. 20, 1996) 
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Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) IN 2001. This was meant to provide legal support to 
developing countries in order to increase their scope of participation in WTO activities. It is 
interesting to note that among the BRICS192 (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) 
countries only India is the only BRICS country that is a member of the ACW 
 
4.6 BRICS countries’ relative participation in the DSU. 
BRICS is an acronym describing the association of Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa as 
the emerging and fast growing economies. All 5 BRICS countries are members of the WTO 
with Russia being the latest to join on the 22 August 2012. 
Table 4: Relative Participation of BRICS Countries in WTO Dispute Settlement (The 
main reason why these countries are selected is because they are classified as fastest 
growing developing countries, note that Russia is not included because Russia only 
joined the WTO on the 22 August 2012 and therefore has not actively participated in 
the DSU) 
BRICS: 
WTO 
Disputes 
Complainant Defendant 3rd Party Total BRICS % 
Brazil 25 14 64 103 32% 
China 8 21 78 107 33% 
India 19 20 67 106 33% 
South Africa 0 4 2 6 2% 
Total 52 59 211 322 100% 
Source: Torres 2012 
It is very disturbing that South Africa at this stage has no legislation or formal policy that 
                                                 
192 BRIC is an acronym that describes Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as the association of 
emerging and fast growing economies. 
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dictates how the country should respond to disputes against it or how it should defend its 
WTOs rights against other nations who may flout WTO articles. Another major concern is 
the level of dispute settlement skills, particularly the expertise in the legal aspect of 
international trade disputes within South Africa. The country needs to invest in acquiring 
such esoteric and specialized legal skills by sending its own people to Geneva to study and 
specialize in the WTO/DSU legal framework. 
 
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in South Africa deals with all trade matters. The 
Department comprises of various structures such as the International Trade and Economic 
Development Division (ITEDD), which is a body responsible for all South Africa’s trade 
negotiations, the International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC), which deals with 
trade remedies as well as Trade and Investment South Africa (TISA), which deals with 
disputes involving subsidies granted to South African industries by the DTI.193 
In the case of Acrylic Fabric from Turkey where ITAC instituted anti-circumvention duties 
against Turkey as well as China when their exporters started exporting acrylic blanketing in 
roll form (material that only had to be cut, made and trimmed/CMT) to produce final 
blankets, in order to circumvent the anti-dumping duties. ITAC acted without conducting an 
investigation conforming to the WTO requirements.194Turkey responded by a formal dispute 
and requested consultation with South Africa on the matter. 
The most important learning out of this case is that the South African Mission in Geneva 
must comprise of capable staff with relevant WTO skills. The failure of the South African 
Geneva Mission to inform the ITEDD of the request for consultation by Turkey within 10 
days as provided under article 4.3 of the DSU195, due to understaffing was another lack of 
experience and expertise. South Africa is presented with an urgent need to increase the scope 
of its international dispute settlement skills level. 
The US and the EU have stronger integration with their local industries and therefore the 
state resources are supplemented by those of large and well-organised industries .The 
integration improves the resource base hence such nations are able to mobilise and bring 
                                                 
193 Brink G. International Trade Resolution, Lessons from South Africa. 
194 South Africa – Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Blanketing from Turkey WT/DS288/1 (15 April 2003). 
195 Brink G. International Trade Resolution 
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formidable dispute cases. This is made possible by the use of highly trained lawyers who 
specialise in WTO law, highly trained economists and consultants that are sometimes made 
available by industries who are directly affected by the WTO legal system. 
In order for public authorities in developing countries such as South Africa to engage in such 
complex and sometimes prolonged litigation processes, integration with local industries, 
which are directly affected by WTO rules is important. The DSU as a neutral arbiter of trade 
disputes based on the legal interpretation of WTO agreements should be seen as furthering 
the role of legal adjudication in international trade law. The political and economic influence 
of rich and powerful countries in the WTO is not sustainable, however the rule of law based 
on fair legal principles will ensure that the scales of justice in international trade are brought 
into balance. 
The next chapter will focus on South Africa’s vision for agricultural development and how 
the country plans to put progressive policies in place that are in line with the principle of 
international law as well as WTO agreements which South Africa is signatory. The two 
critical policies in relation to agricultural development will be analysed and those are the 
National Development Plan as well as the New Growth Path. 
 
4.7 The New Growth Path and Agricultural Development 
South Africa also acknowledges in the New Growth Path196 the following key strategies: 
 Deepen the domestic and regional market by growing employment, increasing 
incomes and undertaking other measures to improve equity and income distribution. 
 Widen the market for South African goods and services through stronger focus on 
exports to the region and other rapidly growing economies. 
The New Growth Path has targeted opportunities for 300 000 households in agriculture 
small- holder schemes and 145 000 jobs in agro-processing by 2020197. Agriculture once 
again is identified in the policy as one of the key areas for job creation and self-sustainability. 
                                                 
196 South African Government policy programme of action aimed at creating employment on a large scale to 
respond to substantial changes in conditions in South Africa and in the global environment. 
197 Department of Economic Development The New Growth Path (2010) 8. 
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Global market access and the elimination of agricultural subsidies can level the playing field 
and yield positive outcomes for South African agricultural output.  
It is also very important to acknowledge that the ability to compete globally depends on 
managing volatility in global agricultural market as well as ensuring adaptability. This 
essentially means that the capability to be productive is not the only important thing for 
competitiveness, the ability to be adaptable in order to adjust to structural changes is just as 
important.  
The current export model also needs to be transformed to accommodate basic self-sufficient, 
traditional farming methods as it is currently structured against them. Such transformation 
will be meaningful because without it, market access will provide little or no benefits at all. 
Exports may produce foreign currency earnings for a nation, this does not guarantee that food 
will be available and be affordable to the people. In Thailand, for example, agricultural 
exports increased up to 65% between 1985 and 1995, but the amount of population below 
poverty line increased during the same period to 43%.198 It is however important to highlight 
that in the case of South Africa, agricultural policies should be aligned with South Africa’s 
trading block such as the Southern African Development Co-operation (SADC). This will 
create market access within the region and make it easier to do business within SADC region, 
however challenges still exist particularly on the part of non-tariff measures. 
4.8  The Threat of Non-Tariff Measures in the Southern African Development  
Co-operation Regional Integration. 
 
It is important to highlight that non-tariff measures are not only a hindrance to market access 
between developing and developed countries, but also among developing countries 
themselves. SADC has made substantial progress in encouraging regional integration by 
lowering tariff barriers to regional trade. SADC protocol launched a free trade area in August 
2008, which resulted in 85%199 of intra-SADC trade flows being duty free.200  
The main problem that has however been identified is the escalation of None-Tariff measures 
                                                 
198 Barker D WTO Agreement on Agriculture: Threat to food security and sustainability (undated) 3. 
199 SADC Secretariat, 2008 
200 The FTA is being implemented by Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  
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(NTMs).201 There are a number of NTMs that have been identified to be a major impediment 
of regional trade especially in the Tripartite Territory that includes COMESA (Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa), EAC (East African Community) and SADC 
(Southern African Development Community). The list includes the following NTBs:202 
 Customs Procedures and administrative requirements e.g. anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties, border tax adjustment and deposit requirements on imports. 
 Technical standards e.g. related to health such as sanitary and environmental 
regulations. 
 Government participation in trade and lack of physical infrastructure. 
If one looks at the literature on customs procedure, it indicates that Shoprite (Retail 
supermarket chain) spends approximately US$ 5.8 million per year on administrative costs to 
secure US$ 13.6 million in duty savings under SADC preferences203. Woolworths (Retail 
chain store) chooses not to use SADC preferences when exporting food products in non-
SACU (non-South African Trade Custom Union) markets, but instead to pay full price due to 
costly SADC rules204. This is a serious impediment to regional trade integration that urgently 
needs to be resolved. 
Technical barriers are still part of major impediments to trade within the SADC region. 
National standards and testing requirements, reliance on mandatory inspections and 
certifications are some of the technical barriers used in SADC. It is reported that Namibia and 
Swaziland are the only 2 countries that have adopted all 78 SADC standards for the region.205   
 
 
                                                 
201 Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) refer to restrictions that result from prohibitions, conditions, or specific market 
requirements that make importation or exportation of products difficult and/or costly.  
202  Viljoen V Non –tariff barriers affecting trade in the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Agreement 
(2011) TRALAC Working Paper No I IWPO7/2011. 
203 Gillson I ‘Deepening Regional Trade Integration to eliminate fragmented goods market in Southern Africa’ 
(2010) Africa Trade Policy Notes-World Bank. . 
204 Gillson I ‘Deepening Regional Trade Integration to eliminate fragmented goods market in Southern Africa’ 
(2010) Africa Trade Policy Notes-World Bank.  
 
205 Viljoen V Non –tariff barriers affecting trade in the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Agreement 
(2011) TRALAC Working Paper No I IWPO7/2011. 
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The following barriers affect trade in different agricultural products in the SADC 
region. 
NTB Products affected 
Import bans, quotas 
and levies 
Wheat, poultry, flour, meat, maize, sugar, eggs, pork and fruits & 
vegetables 
Import permits and 
levies 
Eggs, fruit & vegetables, livestock and maize 
Single marketing 
channels 
Wheat, meat, dairy, maize and sugar 
Rules of origin Palm oil and wheat flour 
Export taxes Dried beans, live animals, sugar, maize and coffee 
Standards Milk, meat, maize, bran, cotton cake, poultry, sugar, coffee and 
ostriches. 
Source: Gilson (2010) 
Application of harmonised standards in the SADC regime is critical to encourage intra-
regional trade. Participation of national governments, which includes parastatals in trade in 
the operation of ports and borders can also be used to protect domestic industries and the 
trade of specific monopolistic goods. 
4.9 Mechanism for Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers in the Southern African 
Development Co-operation 
 
SADC Protocol through Article 6 requires all member countries to adopt and implement 
policies that will eliminate current NTBs. This is also the case with regards to the legal 
instruments of the Tripartite Territory that includes COMESA (Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa), EAC (East African Community) and SADC (Southern African 
Development Community). Article 14 of the 2010 Draft Tripartite Agreement provide for a 
common and coordinated mechanism to eliminate NTBs. 
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In the SADC region in particular, NTBs complaints are channelled through to the SADC 
Secretariat, however if the resolution is not found the case is then forwarded to the SADC 
Task Team specifically dealing with NTBs. If the complaint is not resolved at that level it is 
then referred to the SADC Dispute Settlement Mechanism.206 SADC’s legal position on 
NTBs is clear, in that it requires member states to implement measures to eliminate all 
existing NTBs since they can be obstacles to free movement of goods. 
Other mechanisms include the following key pragmatic resolutions: 
 Establishment of National Monitoring Committees (NMCs) and capacity 
building Programme for the NMCs.  
 Introduction of the Proposed Mobile-to-Email Feature of the NTBs 
Reporting, Elimination and Monitoring System. 
 Adoption and Implementation of Electronic SADC Certificate of Origin. 
 Adoption of the use of Harmonised System 2012 by all SADC member states. 
 Adoption of the revised Kyoto Convention207 to simplify and harmonise 
Custom Procedures in SADC. 
 
 
4.10 Recommendations for the Success of Agricultural Trade in South Africa 
 
In order to find future solutions it becomes critical to look at the historical context of trade 
liberalisation. After World War II policy makers adopted Keynesian principles208 to ensure 
economic stability and social welfare by ensuring that governments regulate markets. State 
regulated markets delivered sustainable growth until the United States (US) and Europe 
                                                 
206 Viljoen V Non –tariff barriers affecting trade in the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Agreement 
(2011) TRALAC Working Paper No I IWPO7/2011. 
207  The International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonisation of Customs procedures entered into 
force in 1974. The World Customs Organisation (WCO) adopted the revised Kyoto Convention in June 1999 as 
a blueprint for modern and efficient Customs procedures in the 21st century. 
208 Economists of the time – led by John Maynard Keynes – suggested that the state should get involved in 
regulating capitalism.   They argued that by lowering unemployment, raising wages, and increasing consumer 
demand for goods, the state could guarantee continued economic growth and social wellbeing. 
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found themselves with excess productive capacity and rising wages in the 1970s, they were 
literally producing more than their home markets could absorb.209 These nations needed to 
find access to the Third World markets as a solution to move their excess production. That is 
also when the developing countries experienced debt crises, the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) introduced Structural Adjustment Programmes to offset 
the removal of protectionism. 
 
The Third World countries found themselves in a situation where they needed debt 
restructuring, while the First World countries needed greater access to the Third World 
markets. Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) were packaged with a central feature of 
trade liberalization comprising of the removal of import tariffs and quotas. The adverse 
results is that the numbers of people living on less than $2 per day has risen by almost 50% 
since 1980, to 2.8 billion-billion and that is precisely the period of heavy liberalization.210 
 
South Africa on the other hand embraced the policy of trade liberalization when it became 
part of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and further spear headed its own voluntary 
trade liberation as it is widely discussed in the previous chapters of this study. Trade 
liberalisation has not yielded expected outcomes in South Africa, the GDP (gross domestic 
product) is growing at an insufficient level to have impact on unemployment levels, poverty 
level have risen, with a gene coefficient of 0,7 which reflect one of the highest levels of 
inequality in the world.  
 
Trade liberalisation can yield positive outcome in a long term, if its pace is managed in line 
with political globalisation. Trade imbalances will also have to be addressed since advanced 
industrial economies still maintain tariffs that are four times higher against poor countries 
than the tariffs they have against other rich countries.211 Agricultural subsidies that advanced 
countries introduced have impacted on lowering the price of agricultural export goods from 
South Africa and from other developing countries. WTO’s Doha Development Round, which 
was to address trade imbalances should be completely implemented in order to ensure that 
                                                 
209 See Rosset PM Agricultural Subsidies and Trade Issues: The Key Alternatives (2005) Global Policy 
Innovations Project:  New York.  
210 See World Bank Global Economic Outlook 2000 (2000) The World Bank: Washington DC. 
211 See Stieglitz J Making Globalisation Work-The 2006 Geary Lecture (2008)39 (3)  Economic and Social 
Review 171–190. 
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advanced countries honour their obligations and developing countries are integrated in the 
global economy. 
 
The challenge will only remain if advanced countries with head start advantages continue to 
reap the benefits at the detriment of developing countries, as Friedrich List observed in the 
1840s the behaviour of Holland and then Britain in the face of manufacturing competition, he 
observed: 
It is a very clever common device that when anyone has attained the summit of 
greatness, he kicks away the ladder by which he has climbed up, in order to deprive 
others of the means of climbing up after him. . . . Any nation which by means of 
protective duties and restrictions on navigation has raised her manufacturing power 
and her navigation to such a degree of development that no other nation can sustain 
free competition with her, can do nothing wiser than to throw away these ladders of 
her greatness, to preach to other nations the benefits of free trade, and to declare in 
penitent tones that she has hitherto wandered in the paths of error, and has now for the 
first time succeeded in discovering the truth.212 
  
A critical observation at the current trade negotiations reveals that The First World countries 
are using a range of non-trade barriers (NTBs) to protect their home markets from the Third 
World country’s exports. Market access has become the central theme of current negotiations 
in the WTO due to such unfair trade imbalances. Agricultural subsidies are the other form of 
market distortion, which pose a threat to the development of agriculture.  
South Africa should play a pivotal role in influencing Brazil, Russia and China (BRICS) to 
put pressure to the First World nations to eliminate visible and hidden export subsidies as 
well as non- tariff barriers.  
The transformation of the WTO to focus on reducing the power of transnational corporations 
to collusion and price fixing rather than of breaking the power of state enterprises to 
intervene in prices.213 Sub-Saharan African countries need to harmonise their technical 
regulations and standards, as these countries impose more non-tariff barriers on trade 
                                                 
212 List F National System of Political Economy (1966) 368.  
213 Rosset PM Agricultural Subsidies and Trade Issues: The Key Alternatives (2005) Global Policy Innovations 
Project:  New York.  
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between themselves than on trade with third parties.214 This is essential considering the 
interconnectedness of both the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). Sub-
Saharan African governments need to embrace intra-African trade by ensuring a strong 
political willpower to regional reforms that will be beneficial to the entire regional 
economies. 
 
This becomes urgent and imperative as major global African trade partners are facing major 
economic difficulties such as recession in some countries in the EU and debt crisis in the 
United States. South Africa is already trading well with other South African Development 
Community (SADC) member countries as well as other African countries such as Nigeria, 
Ghana and Kenya. These agreements need to be strengthened to include broader agricultural 
trade and an increased investment on trade related infrastructure.  
 
This chapter discussed two critical documents whose effective implementation would be a 
cornerstone of South Africa’s development. The next chapter will focus on the latest Bali 
Ministerial Round of talks, which covered inter alia trade facilitation, development measures 
in the trade facilitation agreement as well as public stocking for food security measures. The 
focus will still be on agreements encapsulated relating to agricultural reforms and the way 
forward and a view of how ultimately such agreements affect South African position in terms 
of agricultural policy position as far as domestic support or export subsidies are concerned. 
CHAPTER 5 
 
Bali Ministerial Round and the Progress on Elimination of Agricultural Subsidies 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will focus on the latest round of talks and examine issues that were discussed 
and agreements encapsulated in the area of agricultural reforms in the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). The way forward after the Bali Round of talks in terms of what needs 
to be done, as part of post Bali agenda will be analysed. This will determine how lasting 
solutions can be achieved particularly to alleviate the plight of development in the least 
developed and developing countries. 
 
                                                 
214 WTO Deputy Director-General Valentine Rugwabiza, in a speech at the University of Witwatersrand in 
Johannesburg, South Africa on 12 April 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 81 
Some reference to the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) will be made with regards to 
challenges faced by South Africa and other developing countries on issues of anti-dumping 
and subsidies. A further analysis on whether the proposals made by developing countries to 
be allowed to pursue agricultural policies that are supportive of their development goals were 
dealt with successfully or not in the Bali Round. This will enable the evaluation of success 
factors in the roadmap from the Doha Round to the Bali Round of talks. 
 
WTO agricultural negotiation teams had pre-selected 5 burning agricultural issues emanating 
from the Doha Round agricultural negotiations215 to be tabled in the Bali Ministerial 
Conference, these issues include: 
• Export subsidies and other policies known collectively as export competition;  
• Tariff rate quota (TRQ) administration focused on managing persistently under- filled 
quotas;  
• A temporary peace clause for developing countries’ above-market purchases of 
commodities for food-security stockholding programs;  
• A proposed list of green-box-eligible general services of particular interest to 
developing countries; and  
• Cotton, in response to a proposal from four African members.  
 
Member countries wanted to encapsulate agreements based on the commitments made during 
Doha Round of negotiations. In recapping the Doha Development agenda the draft modalities 
on export competition would require developed countries to permanently eliminate all export 
subsidies by 2013 with half cut by 2010. The impasse on which negotiations during the Doha 
Ministerial talks ended meat that some of the issues were going to be finalized in the next 
round of talks and in this case the Bali Round of talks. 
 
The Bali Ministerial Conference was held from the 3-7th December 2013, member states of 
the WTO met in Bali (Indonesia) and agreed on a package that included critical issues, which 
were part of Doha Development agenda (DDA). These issues include trade facilitation, public 
                                                 
215 CRS Report RS22927, WTO Doha Round: Implications for U.S. Agriculture. 
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stocking for food security measures and development and the issues of least developed 
countries. The pillars of the agreement will be unpacked to highlight the impact of the Bali 
ministerial round in the WTO and its members. 
 
Trade Facilitation  
Trade facilitation agreement originates from the GATT‘s mandate in Article V, VIII and X216 
of the GATT up until its current form. Trade facilitation involves enabling and simplification 
of border trade procedures with regards to activities, practices and formalities involved in the 
collection, presentation, communication and processing data for cross-border movement of 
goods.217 Section 1of the Agreement on Trade Facilitation deals with substantive and 
procedural standards, which include availability of information, facilitated customs 
procedures, border cooperation and dispute resolution. 
 
This part of trade facilitation is important for the African continent, as it will reduce the cost 
of trading among traders within the continent. This in turn will improve Africa’s 
competitiveness because the key impediment to intra-African trade is non-tariff barriers that 
continue to stifle the movement of goods and services across borders, despite the fact that 
tariffs have progressively fallen.  Trade facilitation would enable South Africa and the rest of 
the continent to focus on Africa’s development, industrialisation and integration. 
 
In as much as trade facilitation has laid fundamental goals that seemingly would reduce the 
cost of trading, the conundrum for developing countries is whether to prioritise trade 
facilitation over other development concerns such as infrastructure and capacity building,  
which in essence are the factors that would enable the implementation of trade facilitation to 
be more effective in terms of beneficiation particularly in developing countries.  
 
Development Measures in the Trade Facilitation Agreement  
Section II of the two part of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) consists of the special 
and differential treatment provisions. The agreement provides for three categories of 
                                                 
216 Article V relating to freedom of transit, VIII to fees and formalities connected with importation and 
exportation and X relating to publication and administration of trade regulations. (Annex D of the Doha Round 
Working Programme) 
217 See Jatkar A & Mukumba C Unpacking the Bali Package: A snapshot of the Bali Ministerial Decisions of the 
WTO Members (2014) CUTS International: Jaipur.  
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provisions in relation to developing and least developing countries. Category A (Provisions 
requiring the shortest time for implementation o the TFA), Category B and Category C 
(Requiring additional capacity building using the support provided by developed countries)218 
 
The amount of time available to notify the committee with regards to definitive dates for 
implementation of category B provisions was agreed to a full year.219 Category C provisions 
dictates that after one year of entry into the TFA, the developing country member states must 
inform the committee regarding the capacity building arrangements entered into with the 
donor member states.220 Essentially category C provisions provide developing countries up to 
two and a half years after entry into force before the provision would need to be 
implemented. This provides time for developing countries to work with developed countries 
in building capacity.  
 
The TFA further solidify its intent by explicitly providing for changes in the dispute 
settlement system in relation to developing country member states and implementation of 
facilitation measures. The TFA provides the grace period of Article XXIII of the GATT, 
which means for the period of 8 years in the case of category B and C measures for least 
developed countries six years, in the case of category A measures for least developed 
countries and 2 years in the case of category A measures for developing countries. 
 It can also be notes on the text that no disputes can be brought against trade facilitation 
measures implemented by these countries (developing and the least developed countries) by 
other members of the WTO.221 This is to further shield developing and the least developed 
countries in order to catch up on infrastructure and capacity building. 
 
Public Stocking for Food Security Measures  
Agricultural related issues have proven to be the main source of disagreement, even in Bali, 
agriculture as it relates to public stock holding threatened to derail the overall agreement. The 
provisions for food security in the AoA comprise of the rules on public stocking for food 
security purposes222and the provision of domestic food aid.223 The G-33 224countries made a 
                                                 
218 Trade Facilitation Agreement, Section II, Article 2. 
219 TFA, Section II, Article 4.1 (b). 
220 TFA, Section II, Article 4.1 (d). 
221 TFA, Section II, Article 8. 
222 Annex 2 of the AoA (paragraph 3). 
223  Annex 2 of the AoA      (paragraph 4)                                                                                                  
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proposal that developing country government should be allowed to buy food from low 
income or resource poor producers at government set prices without having to count a price 
difference in the aggregate measurement of support (AMS) of the product, as it is the subject 
of limitation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It has been highlighted especially in chapter four of this mini thesis that International law, 
unlike domestic legal systems, is ‘decentralized’ in that it has no central legislator creating its 
rules. The creators of international law are at the same time the main subjects of international 
law, namely states. States as subjects of international law, unlike individuals in domestic law, 
do not elect the  ‘international legislator’, which is then mandated to make law on their 
behalf. 
To date, a limited exception is international organizations, insofar as they themselves (not 
their members) create rules of international law (the so-called acts of international 
organizations). The WTO is one such organisation, which is given legitimacy by its member 
states. South Africa, as stated in chapter one of this mini thesis seeks to participate in global 
trade environment that is based on fair market access, access to technology and the reduction 
of distortions that existed from indirect payments.  
It is also for that reason why South Africa’s domestic trade policy went beyond the call of the 
WTO in reducing tariffs to encourage investment as well as market access.  
There has been substantial improvement in market access for South Africa in targeted market 
for South African agricultural products such as the EU, however for many developing 
countries market access remains the main issue for their own products. Real reductions in 
trade distorting domestic support will enable South Africa some policy space to address 
developmental needs with regards to land reform and farmer settlement. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
224 G33 is a group of developing countries that coordinate on trade and economic issues. 
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Recommendations 
Trade reform should result in more transparent and more market oriented polices, which can 
be achieved by eliminating all forms of export subsidies. In as much as critical issues such 
trade facilitation and public stocking were a success in the Bali Package as discussed in 
chapter five, it is disappointing that the WTO membership did not arrive at the conclusion to 
put an end to export subsidies. The significance of agriculture in terms of jobs, growth and 
development makes it a critical pillar of negotiations in the WTO, hence the finalization of all 
agricultural issues will lead to global trade sustainability. 
South Africa as part of BRICS should engage the WTO as a formidable block with common 
agenda of multilateralism, transparency and inclusiveness, such partnership can also drive 
proactive proposition of BRICS’s own plurilateral initiatives especially with regards to 
agricultural. It is also critical that within the special and differential treatment provisions, the 
least developed countries should be enabled through the provision of technical capacity as 
well as financial assistance to drive implementation of such provisions. 
South Africa needs to constantly align its agricultural trade strategies with the evolving 
global trade environment but within the parameters of international law as well as WTO 
provisions. South Africa even though is part of BRICS it still needs to ensure that it does not 
isolate itself from other major developing countries, which if combined can strengthen its 
alliance and influence in the multilateral trade system. 
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